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THE LIBERAL CASE FOR HOBBY LOBBY
Brett H. McDonnell*

The Supreme Court decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. has stirred
strong objections from political liberals. Those objections are misguided, and the
Court’s opinion reflects core liberal values of social responsibility and tolerance
of diversity.
In the first half of its decision, the Court held that in some circumstances, forprofit corporations committed to religious goals may invoke the religious liberty
protection of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Liberals have
treated this as an appalling and/or humorous extension of rights, which should
apply only to humans. However, the Court’s decision rightly recognizes that
corporations can, and sometimes do, pursue goals other than shareholder profits.
This fits well with the stress on corporate social responsibility one finds in
progressive corporate law scholarship such as the Author’s. Where religious
beliefs shape a corporation’s purposes, the protections of RFRA may rightly apply.
This Article suggests a detailed framework for determining when particular
corporations are engaged in the exercise of religion, looking to both
organizational and ownership dimensions of commitment to religion. This
framework clarifies the somewhat sketchy analysis of the Court and more firmly
roots that analysis in corporate law and theory.
In the second half of the opinion, the Court held that the contraceptive mandate of
the Affordable Care Act substantially burdens the religious exercise of employers,
and that the mandate is not the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling
governmental objective. Liberals fear that this holding aggressively extends the
protection of RFRA while undermining the compelling goal of the contraceptive
mandate. In fact, the holding is quite nuanced and limited, and much liberal
reaction reflects discomfort with RFRA itself. That is a shame, as creating a
diverse society where persons and groups with differing beliefs are able to coexist
is a core liberal commitment. Liberals may have lost sight of this commitment as
the groups invoking RFRA’s protection have shifted from social outcasts to more
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mainstream religious conservatives. That may explain, but does not justify, liberal
opposition to Hobby Lobby.
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INTRODUCTION
In June of 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court announced its decision in
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.1 The Court held that the contraceptive
mandate provision implemented under the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”)2 violated
the free exercise right under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”)3 of
the plaintiff, for-profit corporations. The case received a huge amount of media
attention—more than any case of that term for the Court. Reaction to the decision
was intense and highly polarized. Conservatives celebrated,4 while liberals
expressed outrage.5 That liberal reaction began with Justice Ginsburg’s vehement
dissent, which forecasts a perilously slippery slope of potential future cases. 6

1.
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
2.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (2010).
3.
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–2000bb-4
(2012).
4.
See Kendall Breitman, Right Celebrates Hobby Lobby Ruling on Twitter,
POLITICO (June 30, 2014, 12:24 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/06/hobby-lobbyruling-reactions-twitter-108440.html.
5.
See Tina Nguyen, ‘I Feel Sick’: Liberal Pundits React to SCOTUS Hobby
Lobby Ruling, MEDIAITE (June 30, 2014, 11:09 AM), http://www.mediaite.com/online/ifeel-sick-liberal-pundits-react-to-scotus-hobby-lobby-ruling/; Richard Thompson Ford,
Hobby Lobby Decision Is Proof That Antidiscrimination Laws Often Discriminate, N.Y.
TIMES
(July
1,
2015,
6:02
PM),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/06/30/congress-religion-and-the-supremecourts-hobby-lobby-decision/hobby-lobby-decision-is-proof-that-antidiscrimination-lawsoften-discriminate; Marci A. Hamilton, Hobby Lobby Has Opened a Minefield of Extreme
Religious
Liberty,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
1,
2014,
1:24
PM),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/06/30/congress-religion-and-the-supremecourts-hobby-lobby-decision/hobby-lobby-has-opened-a-minefield-of-extreme-religiousliberty; Mark Tushnet, True Religious Freedom Leaves State Out of It, N.Y. TIMES (June 30,
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One can break the decision in Hobby Lobby down into two main parts,
and liberals have objected vigorously to both. In the first part, the Court held that,
in appropriate circumstances, for-profit corporations committed to pursuing
religious goals may invoke the religious liberty protections of RFRA. Many have
seen this as an unjustified extension of rights of a sort that should extend only to
live persons, not artificial persons such as corporations.7 It is seen as part of an
ongoing movement by the Court’s conservative majority to tilt the playing field
towards corporations.8
The second part of the decision involves the application of RFRA to the
ACA contraceptive mandate. The Court held that the contraceptive mandate
substantially burdens the free exercise rights of religious corporations, and that the
government could not justify that burden as the least restrictive means of achieving
a compelling interest.9 Critics claim that the Court found a burden on employers
where no real burden existed and ignored the costs imposed on female
employees.10 They fear the case will be used to undermine a number of other laws,
with attention particularly focused on anti-discrimination laws.11 Underlying this
reaction seems to be distrust of RFRA itself, and a desire to strictly cabin the
statute.
This Article argues that the liberal reaction to each part of the Hobby
Lobby decision is misguided. Rather, the decision is rooted in principles liberals
should find deeply attractive. The corporate standing to sue analysis reflects a view
of the corporation that closely resembles the picture drawn by progressive
corporate law scholars.12 The majority opinion stresses that corporations can, and
2014, 8:28 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/06/30/congress-religionand-the-supreme-courts-hobby-lobby-decision/true-religious-freedom-leaves-state-out-of-it.
6.
Infra note 163 and accompanying text.
7.
Kent Greenfield, Hobby Lobby Symposium: Hobby Lobby,
“Unconstitutional Conditions,” and Corporate Law Mistakes, SCOTUSBLOG (June 30,
2014, 9:07 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/hobby-lobby-symposium-hobbylobby-unconstitutional-conditions-and-corporate-law-mistakes/; Binyamin Applebaum,
What the Hobby Lobby Ruling Means for America, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 27, 2014, at
MM14; Dana Milbank, In Hobby Lobby Ruling, the Supreme Court Uses a ‘Fiction,’
WASH. POST (June 30, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/dana-milbank-inhobby-lobby-ruling-the-supreme-court-uses-a-fiction/2014/06/30/37663c72-009b-11e48572-4b1b969b6322_story.html.
8.
The other recent Court decision that has been most demonized in a similar
way is Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
9.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).
10.
Emily Bazelon, Supreme Court Breakfast Table: Corporations Had an
Incredible Year at the Supreme Court, SLATE (June 30, 2014, 6:43 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/features/2014/scotus_r
oundup/supreme_court_hobby_lobby_decision_it_was_all_about_sex.html;
Dahlia
Lithwick,
After
Hobby
Lobby,
SLATE
(July
9,
2014,
6:05
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2014/07/after_hobby_lobby_mucullen_and
_harris_v_quinn_the_men_of_the_supreme_court.html.
11.
Ford, supra note 5.
12.
See KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL
FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES (2007); PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence
E. Mitchell ed., 1995); Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby
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do pursue a large variety of ends beyond simply maximizing the profit that flows
to shareholders. Corporations may be used to pursue moral goals that aim to make
the world a better place—an idea that resonates with the (generally left-of-center)
corporate social responsibility movement. 13 Where such goals are rooted in
religious principles, a corporation may, and should, be able to invoke RFRA
protections.
The liberal reaction to the second half of the Hobby Lobby decision shows
that many contemporary liberals have drifted away from a core commitment of the
liberal tradition. “Liberal” is derived from “liberty,” and liberalism has
traditionally strongly supported religious liberty for all. 14 This is rooted in a
commitment to creating a diverse society where persons and groups with differing
beliefs are able to co-exist with as much room as possible to exercise those beliefs
without constraint. RFRA reflects and attempts to advance that commitment, and
the Hobby Lobby decision for the most part reasonably balances the competing
interests of religiously minded employers’ liberty and employee access to health
care under the ACA.
This Article argues that Hobby Lobby reflects and advances these core
liberal values in the following seven sections. Part I describes the history of RFRA
and the cases cited in Hobby Lobby. Of particular note here is the strong liberal
support for the principles underlying RFRA, both by liberal justices in the old Free
Exercise clause cases and by congressional Democrats and President Clinton in the
passage of RFRA.
Part II introduces the corporate standing issue, i.e., whether and when forprofit corporations should be protected under RFRA. It presents the two best
arguments against such standing. One argument is that those who run such
corporations allegedly have a fiduciary duty to focus solely on maximizing
shareholder financial returns.15 The other argument is that corporations have a
separate legal personality quite distinct from their shareholders, and it is
Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1 (2014/2015); Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy, or
Economics Meets Civic Republicanism at Work, 13 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 334 (2008).
Note that insofar as there is an identified left-of-center group of scholars within American
corporate law, it has tended to use the term “progressive” rather than “liberal.” Many
political activists also use that term. In this paper, I occasionally use the term “progressive,”
but mostly stick with the term “liberal” to describe those who tend towards left-of-center
views in politics. I do so because that term remains the most-used word for such persons
within U.S. politics today. Perhaps more significantly, I use the term “liberal” because of its
ties to the concept of liberty.
13.
For an overview of related issues, see Ian B. Lee, The Role of the Public
Interest in Corporate Law, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW
106 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012). For a recent survey of the economics
literature, see Markus Kutzmueller & Jay Shimshack, Economic Perspectives on Corporate
Social Responsibility, 50 J. ECON. LIT. 51 (2012).
14.
One can see this in the great liberal thinkers from John Locke, see JOHN
LOCKE, LETTERS CONCERNING TOLERATION (1689), to John Rawls, see DANIEL A.
DOMBROWSKI, RAWLS AND RELIGION: THE CASE FOR POLITICAL LIBERALISM (2001). For a
recent statement of this tradition, see MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN
DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY (2008).
15.
See infra notes 73–77 and accompanying text.
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inappropriate to infer corporate religious beliefs from the beliefs of individual
shareholders.16
Part III then analyzes the flaws in those two arguments, and builds upon
that analysis to suggest a framework for assessing when a corporation may claim
RFRA protection. As progressive corporate law scholars have stressed contra the
duty argument, corporations may legitimately pursue a wide variety of ends.17 The
argument against standing based on the separate legal personality of corporations
is (somewhat) valid when opposing one particular way of deriving RFRA standing
for corporations. That argument looks to the religious beliefs of individual
shareholders. A better grounded argument for corporate RFRA standing looks to
commitments made within the legal structure of a corporation, with the board of
directors as the key decision-maker. The resulting framework for analyzing RFRA
standing considers two dimensions: organizational and ownership. Along each
dimension, a corporation can vary from no to high religious commitment.
Ownership looks to the number and concentration of shareholders, and the degree
to which they share strongly held religious beliefs. More importantly, the
organizational dimension looks to various ways in which the corporation, as an
organization, has formally or informally committed to following a religious
purpose. Where a corporation shows a strong, pervasive, and lasting commitment
through the dimensions in combination, that corporation helps to advance the
religious purpose of various groups who come together in the business.
Part IV analyzes the Court’s opinion in Hobby Lobby and shows that it is
quite consistent with the arguments and framework presented in Part III. The Court
sees corporations as collective organizations that help a range of constituents
pursue not just financial gains, but also a variety of other goals. Liberals seem to
have been blinded either by a strong distrust of corporations or by an inability to
identify with socially motivated businesses whose goals flow from religious beliefs
rather than more secular values. A clearer picture shows that the Court’s vision of
corporations is highly consistent with liberal visions of the corporation.
Parts V and VI explore the Court’s application of RFRA to the ACA
contraceptive mandate. Part V considers whether the mandate imposes a
substantial burden on religious employers. The majority and the dissent grasp
opposing sides of a real dilemma. The dissent argues that the link between
employers and the use of controversial contraceptives is too indirect and, as such,
the statute does not substantially burden employers. However, this position
requires uniform acceptance of individual complicity in complex causal situations,
which itself is a hotly debated topic on which moral traditions differ.18 The
majority prefers to accept believers’ assertions that the mandate places a burden on

16.
See infra notes 78–80 and accompanying text.
17.
There is some debate over how far the Court goes in this direction, with
some arguing that the Court thinks that other ends are appropriate only where shareholders
have explicitly approved such goals. I argue that the best interpretation of the majority
opinion, as a whole, assumes that corporations may pursue other goals more readily than
that. See infra notes 128–45 and accompanying text.
18.
See infra notes 182–91 and accompanying text.
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their religious principles.19 Although this position opens the door to potential
abuse,20 the majority’s approach is truer to the purpose of RFRA than that of the
dissent. However, it should be stressed that the Court should closely examine
whether the asserted religious beliefs are truly genuine in future cases.21
Part VI analyzes the Court’s application of RFRA’s strict scrutiny
language. The Court held that promoting contraceptive access for women could be
a compelling interest, but the ACA’s contraceptive mandate as applied to for-profit
corporations was not the least restrictive means of achieving that interest.
Although there is some language in the majority opinion that can be read broadly,
ultimately the opinion—especially Justice Kennedy’s concurrence—is a limited,
fact-specific accommodation, whose extension beyond the contraceptive mandate
is questionable. The burden on religious employers is lessened, while female
employees still receive coverage at no greater cost.22 It is a win-win solution, and a
good illustration of how careful use of RFRA can advance legal goals while
reducing the burden they place on religious believers.23
Part VII concludes. The fact that this limited and compelling
accommodation has stirred such outrage illustrates that many contemporary
liberals no longer support vigorous application of religious liberty. This may be
explained by a change in political alignment and an analysis of who stands to gain
from religious liberty laws like RFRA. In RFRA’s foundational cases, the
plaintiffs were generally members of nonmainstream religious groups operating in
a society that was often unwilling to take their beliefs seriously. Liberals saw
protecting them as part of their mission of protecting underdogs and promoting a
diverse society. However, liberals have recently won some significant battles in
the “culture wars,” and more mainstream conservative religious groups are looking
to use RFRA to put some limits on the resulting statutes. Many liberals do not
sympathize with this use of RFRA, and fear the role of still powerful conservative
religious groups who continue to try to restrict the liberties of those whom their
religion condemns.24 Combined with populist distrust of corporations, they see the
Court in Hobby Lobby as going wrong in all sorts of ways. That is a shame. RFRA
could provide a useful safety valve in the culture wars, serving as a way to protect
some of the interests of traditionalist religious groups while still preserving the
19.
See infra notes 183–86 and accompanying text.
20.
See infra notes 188–93 and accompanying text.
21.
See infra notes 191–93 and accompanying text.
22.
See infra notes 221–24 and accompanying text.
23.
It is true that the Court holds open the possibility that this accommodation
itself may violate RFRA. Should the Court in future cases hold that it does, in a way that is
not trivial and easy-to-correct, the Court will have pulled a bait and switch, which could
undermine much of the attraction of the Hobby Lobby opinion. However, the Court has not
yet done so, and there is much reason to hope that it will not. See infra notes 224–29 and
accompanying text.
24.
See Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL.
L. REV. 839, 878–79. One part of this may be that many liberals were never all that devoted
to the abstract principle of religious liberty in the first place, and when that principle ceased
to be politically useful for them, they abandoned it. The same is true in reverse on the
conservative side, illustrating that devotion to abstract principles of political theory is likely
not a central motivating factor for most human beings.
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goals of important statutes. Preserving space for diverse beliefs and practices while
advocating a vision of the corporation that stresses their use for social purposes
sounds like a set of principles that liberals should find inspiring. It is too bad that
political polarization and a tribal sense of politics has prevented so many from
appreciating what the Court has done.

I. LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Free Exercise Clause was incorporated against the states in 1940,25
and after that, federal courts began to hear more cases in the area. It became
increasingly important to determine the scope of the beliefs and behavior that the
Clause protects. Clearly, statutes that explicitly discriminate or regulate religious
practices were covered by the Clause. It was also possible that the Clause would
apply to a statute that on its face said nothing about religion but was enacted with
the clear intent to discriminate against the beliefs of a religion. 26 But, what of cases
that involved a statute of general applicability that did not facially regulate religion
and was not intended to discriminate against any religion, but as applied, would
force members of a religion to behave in a way that violated significant religious
beliefs? Does the Free Exercise Clause provide any protection of religious
believers in such cases?
The traditional answer was no.27 However, beginning with Sherbert v.
Verner in 1963, the Court began to apply the Free Exercise Clause in such
circumstances. Sherbert involved a Seventh Day Adventist who refused to work on
Saturdays (the Sabbath for that religion), was fired, and was denied unemployment
compensation. In an opinion by Justice Brennan, the Court held that if a facially
neutral statute imposed a substantial burden on genuinely held religious beliefs,
that application of the statute was invalid unless it could be shown to be the least
restrictive means to achieve a compelling governmental interest. The least
restrictive means/compelling interest standard is used in a variety of areas of
constitutional law, and is commonly called “strict scrutiny,” although there is
much room to doubt whether the Court applied strict scrutiny in the same way in
this context compared with others. 29 With Sherbert, the Court recognized that the
Free Exercise Clause protects not just the ability to hold and proclaim religious
beliefs, but also the ability to act upon those beliefs.
28

After Sherbert, the Court followed a somewhat wobbly path in applying
the Sherbert test. In several other cases, it used the test to strike down the
application of a statute, most famously in Wisconsin v. Yoder,30 where the Court
held that Amish youth could not be required to attend school until they were
25.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
26.
Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 213 (1994).
27.
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878); Ira C. Lupu, Of Time
and the RFRA: A Lawyers’ Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 MONT. L.
REV. 171, 176 (1995).
28.
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
29.
Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA
L. REV. 1465, 1498–1501 (1999).
30.
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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sixteen. In some cases, however, the plaintiffs’ claims failed.31 In certain of those
cases, the Court held that the statute in question did not substantially burden the
plaintiffs’ religious exercise.32 Yet in others, it held that strict scrutiny did not
apply within a certain class of regulation, notably the military. 33 And still in others,
it applied strict scrutiny but held that the application of the law withstood that
scrutiny.34 Nonetheless, for several decades the Sherbert test provided potent
protection of religious liberty.
That changed in 1990 with Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith.35 In that case, the Court effectively overturned the
Sherbert test. In a blatantly forced and misleading interpretation of the postSherbert case law, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion searched for ways to interpret
away every case that seemed to be applying Sherbert’s test, ultimately denying
that any such test ever really existed. More plausibly, Justice Scalia warned that
general application of the Sherbert test threatened the rule of law, and was suspect
under the Establishment Clause. Given the incredibly wide range of modern
statutes affecting almost every area of life, and the broad array of religious beliefs
in the United States, it will frequently happen that someone’s religious beliefs are
substantially burdened by a statute. Were the Court to apply a stringent test in all
such instances, it would frequently hold that statutes do not apply to particular
religious groups. This would leave statutes riddled with holes, and risk benefiting
the groups who are able to claim special accommodations based on their religion. 36
Given the subsequent politics of RFRA, it is worth noting that the author of the
opinion in Smith was Justice Scalia, the intellectual leader of the Court’s
conservatives and someone very publicly guided by his Catholic faith. The three
dissenters in Smith were Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall 37—three of the
most liberal justices in the history of the Supreme Court.
Given the politics currently surrounding RFRA, it should come as little
surprise that many religious organizations objected to the decision in Smith. It is
more surprising that many liberal civil rights organizations objected as well—the
ACLU, Americans United for the Separation of Church and State, People for the
American Way, and Americans for Democratic Action came together in a
powerful coalition that proposed a statutory overturning of Smith.38 In 1993 this
coalition succeeded.39 RFRA passed 97–3 in the Senate (where Ted Kennedy
joined Orrin Hatch as the lead sponsor), and unanimously in the House. That is not
a typo. Notably, Democrats controlled both houses at the time, and President Bill
Clinton signed RFRA into law. 40 Thus, at the Court, in Congress, and in the White

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See Lupu, supra note 27, at 176–85.
E.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
E.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
E.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Id. at 885.
Id. at 907 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See Laycock & Thomas, supra note 26, at 210 n.9.
Id. at 210.
Id. at 209.
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House, a large number of liberals supported the principle of religious liberty
embodied in RFRA.
RFRA was intended to reverse Smith and reinstate the Sherbert test41—
although there is debate as to whether it actually did so, or went further. The
statute provides that “Government shall not substantially burden a person’s
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,
except as provided in subsection (b).”42 Subsection (b) then uses the strict scrutiny
language: “Government may burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (1) furthers a compelling
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.”43
RFRA explicitly applied to state and federal laws. However, the Supreme
Court held that Congress did not have the authority to apply RFRA to state laws,
so only the application to federal law remains. 44 In response, some states have
enacted RFRA to apply to their own laws, and in others, the state supreme court
has interpreted the state constitution as imposing the Sherbert test or something
similar.45
As was the case with Sherbert, many questions remain as to how far
RFRA’s protections extend. That brings us to the Hobby Lobby decision, which
poses some of those questions. The case concerns a specific provision of the
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), often called Obamacare. The ACA requires
employers with 50 or more full-time employees to offer health insurance that
meets certain minimum coverage standards, including preventive care for women.
The Health Resources and Services Administration (“HRSA”) was charged with
defining the preventive care standards. HRSA’s guidelines provide that preventive
services include all FDA-approved contraceptive methods. 46
Here is where conflict arises: Several FDA-approved contraceptive
methods work in part by preventing fertilized eggs from developing, and,
according to some religious beliefs, that is a morally-prohibited taking of human
life.47 The Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) addressed the
resulting conflict with a pair of exemptions. One of these exempted religious
employers, including churches, from the requirement completely. 48 Other religious
nonprofit organizations received a somewhat more complicated accommodation. If

41.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4)–(5).
42.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a).
43.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b).
44.
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
45.
As of 2010, sixteen states had enacted a “baby RFRA” statute; other states
have constitutional protections that state courts have interpreted along the lines of Sherbert.
Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L.
REV. 466, 479 (2010). The Baptist Joint Committee for Religious Liberty says there are now
21 states with state RFRAs. Don Byrd, State RFRA Bill Tracker, THE BAPTIST JOINT COMM.
FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.bjconline.org/state-rfra-tracker-2015/.
46.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762 (2014).
47.
Laycock, supra note 24, at 853 n.81.
48.
Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2763.
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an organization that fits within the terms of this accommodation objects to the
contraceptive mandate, it may notify its insurer. That insurer must then separately
pay to provide contraceptive services to the employees of the religious nonprofit.
That may seem harsh for the insurers, but HHS has determined that the costs of
providing contraceptives is balanced out by savings from the reduction of
pregnancy-related expenses that follow.49
Most employers, being neither churches nor religious nonprofits, do not
benefit from either of these accommodations, however, and many sued under
RFRA. Two cases were consolidated for the hearing before the Supreme Court.
One of these involved Conestoga Wood Specialties,50 a woodworking business
owned by the Hahn family—two parents and their three children who are devout
members of the Mennonite Church. Conestoga Wood is a for-profit corporation
incorporated under Pennsylvania law. In addition to owning all shares, the Hahns
control the board of directors,51 and one of the sons serves as president and CEO.
As I will discuss below, the Hahns believed that complying with the contraceptive
mandate would violate their religious beliefs. They pointed to the company’s
Vision and Values Statement and to a board-adopted Statement on the Sanctity of
Human Life as evidence that they had incorporated those religious beliefs into
their business. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania denied the requested preliminary injunction, and the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that for-profit corporations are not able to sue
under RFRA.
The other case before the Supreme Court involved two corporations
owned by the Green family, also two parents and their three children, and also
devout Christians.52 One of the corporations was Hobby Lobby, a large chain of
arts and crafts stores with 500 stores and over 13,000 employees. The other
corporation, Mardel, is a chain of 35 Christian bookstores. Both companies are forprofit corporations incorporated in Oklahoma. The Green family controls all
shares53 and its members serve as directors and top officers. As with Conestoga,
and again to be explored further below, the Greens pointed to various corporate
statements and practices to show that they had incorporated their religious beliefs

49.
Id.
50.
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t Health & Human
Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013).
51.
They at least control the board in the sense that collectively they own all of
the shares, and thus can determine who will be on the board as long as they vote together,
which they appear to have done from what one can glean from the facts presented (anyone
familiar with either corporate law or families will here want to insert the caveat that family
members do not always continue to agree on important matters). Given that one family
member is also the CEO, it would appear that the family actively monitors the business as
well, although the opinion does not give much detail.
52.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013).
53.
The family actually owns Hobby Lobby through a trust. The five family
members are the trustees and beneficiaries of the trust that, in turn, owns all of the shares of
Hobby Lobby. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1284 (W.D.
Okla. 2012).
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into the business.54 The Greens had more success than the Hahns in the lower
courts—they too lost in district court, but the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that for-profit corporations may sue under RFRA, and that the
contraceptive mandate burdened the plaintiffs’ religious exercises and was not
justified under the strict scrutiny test.
These cases raise three questions to be explored in the next three sections:
(1) Do for-profit corporations ever have standing to sue under RFRA (and, if so,
when)?; (2) Does the contraceptive mandate substantially burden the free exercise
rights of the plaintiffs?; and (3) If the answers to the previous questions are yes,
can the mandate be justified under the strict scrutiny language of RFRA?
The Court answered each of these questions in favor of the plaintiffs. Yes,
for-profit corporations do, in some circumstances, have standing to sue under
RFRA. Yes, the contraceptive mandate substantially burdens the free exercise
rights of the plaintiffs. No, that mandate is not justified under strict scrutiny.
In the next three sections, I consider in turn each of the above questions. I
look at the Court’s legal analysis and argue that liberal unhappiness with the
decision is mostly unjustified.

II. RFRA AND THE DILEMMA OF FOR-PROFIT CORPORATIONS
The gateway question, and most broadly important legal issue in Hobby
Lobby, is whether for-profit corporations can ever sue to claim the protections of
RFRA. And, if so, when? It is a gateway question because if the answer is no, then
the case ends, at least as far as the corporate plaintiffs are concerned. 55 This
question is important because the Court’s answer that corporations can sue applies
whenever a RFRA claim is asserted against the imposition of any federal statute,
not just the ACA. There are thousands of federal statutes, and they cover just about
every area of life and society. One cannot anticipate all of the different contexts in
which a corporation might assert a RFRA claim. For instance, a source of anxiety
for many has been a potential RFRA defense against employees who claim that
their employer discriminated against them on the basis of sexual orientation. This
concern is rather speculative, given that sexual orientation is not a protected
category under Title VII, and the Employment Non-Discrimination Act,56 which
would add sexual orientation to the list, does not have a realistic prospect of
passage anytime soon.57 Note also that this gateway question is actually two
54.
See Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Law and Theory in Hobby Lobby, in THE
RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 4 (Zoë Robinson et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press
2015), http://www.papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2609585.
55.
There is the possibility that the controlling family members could have
standing to sue as shareholders, directors, or officers. The issue is important and related, but
for simplicity’s sake I will not address it. Because both the Court and I say that corporations
have standing to invoke RFRA in appropriate circumstances, the alternative of standing for
individual persons within the corporation becomes less crucial.
56.
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, H.R. 1755, S. 815, 113th
Cong. (2013).
57.
Conflict could arise at the state level, but only in a state that has both a
statute forbidding discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and a state version of
RFRA. There are not many such states, and those states are not bound by the Supreme
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questions: Can for-profit corporations sue under RFRA at all? And, if so, when can
they?58 This section frames these questions and presents the two leading arguments
against allowing for-profit corporations to sue under RFRA. The next section
responds to those two arguments and presents a framework for analyzing when
corporations should be able to sue for protection under RFRA—as indeed liberal
and progressive principles of corporate law suggest they should be able to do.
Analysis of this corporate standing issue begins with the text of RFRA.
The core text of interest to this portion of our analysis is “Government shall not
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from
a rule of general applicability.”59 The issue then becomes whether corporations are
persons for the purpose of this statute, and more particularly, are they persons
capable of exercising religion? If so, when can we say that a particular corporation
is exercising religion?
The term “person” is not defined within RFRA itself. As a result, Justice
Alito’s majority opinion starts its analysis of the term by looking to the Dictionary
Act, which defines the word “person” as used in federal statutes generally.60 Under
that Act, “the wor[d] ‘person’ . . . include[s] corporations, companies, associations,
firms, partnerships, society, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.”61
The context of a particular statute may indicate otherwise, but this is the starting
point. That starting point accords well with general common law and corporate
law, which treat corporations as persons for a host of legal issues, such as the
ability to enter into contracts or to sue and be sued. 62
That is the starting point, but we are very far from being finished. Is there
something about the context of RFRA that dictates corporations should not be
treated as persons? Or, even if corporations are persons under RFRA, does it make
sense to say that they are capable of exercising religion? Common sense might
answer no to the latter question. How can a legal entity, with no body or mind of
its own, have, or act, upon religious beliefs? The thought seems comically absurd,
to the benefit of writers for left-of-center comics.63
To answer this question in a nonhumorous (but one hopes not humorless)
way, we must consider RFRA’s context. RFRA was enacted to protect religious
liberty rights, and should be understood in the context of the Free Exercise Clause,
particularly as interpreted in the pre-Smith case law that RFRA was intended to
Court’s interpretation of the federal RFRA when it comes to interpreting their own state
statute.
58.
For convenience, I refer to both of these closely related questions as the
corporate standing question. Context should make clear which of the two I am discussing
where the distinction matters.
59.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (emphasis added).
60.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014).
61.
1 U.S.C. § 1.
62.
ERIC ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONS: A LEGAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (2013).
63.
See, e.g., Janet Allon, WATCH: Jon Stewart Mocks the Hobby Lobby Ruling
that
Corporations
Are
People,
ALTERNET
(July
13,
2014),
http://www.alternet.org/video/watch-jon-stewart-mocks-hobby-lobby-ruling-corporationsare-people; Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Hobby Lobby (HBO), YOUTUBE (June 30,
2014), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zSQCH1qyIDo.
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resurrect.64 The majority and dissent in Hobby Lobby have some back and forth as
to what the pre-Smith case law says about for-profit corporations exercising
religion,65 with particular focus on the various opinions in Gallagher v. Crown
Kosher Super Market of Massachusetts, Inc.66
One must then ask whether granting for-profit corporations RFRA rights
fits with the general purposes of RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause. The Court
recognizes that corporations have constitutional rights in a variety of contexts,
notably the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment.67 The Court does so
because individuals often exercise their rights collectively in organizations,
including corporations. Protecting such corporations helps protect the individuals
involved in them.
The exercise of religion is sometimes done in collective organizations as
well. The most obvious example is churches, which are often legally organized as
nonprofit corporations. Both First Amendment and RFRA case law recognize that
such organizations have protected rights. 68 One might try to limit such rights only
to organizations like churches that are specifically and exclusively dedicated to
religious worship. However, what of nonprofit corporations that are clearly tied to
a particular religious group while advancing some of that group’s religiously
motivated beliefs by providing services such as schooling, health care, or
charitable giving? It seems pretty widely recognized that such nonprofit
corporations should also be seen as having free exercise rights. 69
Does involvement in commercial, for-profit business then put one outside
the protections of the Free Exercise clause and RFRA? Justice Alito’s opinion
points out that the Court had already decided it does not. This opinion points to
several Free Exercise cases in which the Court considered the rights of individual
business persons.70 Although in some cases the plaintiffs ultimately lost, the Court
nonetheless recognized their standing to make a claim—simply holding that the
law withstood strict scrutiny. 71
Thus, our question has become more focused. If nonprofit corporations
can claim RFRA protection, and individuals engaged in for-profit businesses can
64.
See supra notes 27–40 and accompanying text.
65.
Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2772–73, 2794.
66.
366 U.S. 617 (1961). I would summarize the result of that back and forth as
follows: the pre-Smith case law contains no definitive holding either that for-profit
corporations can exercise protected Free Exercise rights or that they cannot. The majority
and dissent draw different inferences as to the implications of this silence for interpreting
RFRA. I do not think that an inference from silence in either direction is very strong or
persuasive.
67.
See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010);
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
68.
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418
(2006); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
69.
As indeed was done with the contraceptive mandate itself. See supra notes
46–49 and accompanying text.
70.
Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2769–70 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599
(1961); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982)).
71.
Id.
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as well, is there anything about the for-profit corporation that categorically
excludes it from claiming RFRA protection?
There are two leading reasons that individuals use to argue that for-profit
corporations are indeed special such that RFRA should never protect them. I think
that both reasons are wrong. However, in exploring them, we will not only be
answering critics of this portion of the Hobby Lobby opinion, but also gaining
insight into both why for-profit corporations should be able to claim RFRA rights
and, just as importantly, when they should be able to do so.72 So let us first see
those two leading arguments against RFRA standing for for-profit corporations,
and then move on to why those arguments are wrong.
The first argument against RFRA protecting for-profit corporations arises
from a particular understanding of the fiduciary duty of corporate directors and
officers. Under this argument, officers owe a duty to corporate shareholders, and
the only allowable goal of the corporation is to maximize the financial return that
shareholders receive. Let us call this the “shareholder conception” of the
corporation (which we shall soon contrast with the “stakeholder conception”). The
locus classicus for legal articulations of the shareholder conception of the
corporation is the old case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Corporation.73 Recent cases
that describe the shareholder conception of the corporation include Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.74 and eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v.
Newmark.75 A number of scholars agree with this view of the purpose of the
corporation.76
If a strong version of the shareholder conception is correct, it might
explain why for-profit corporations are critically different from both nonprofit
corporations and unincorporated for-profit businesses. Nonprofit corporations are
allowed to have a wide range of purposes, including religious purposes. For-profit
corporations are allowed just one purpose, maximizing returns to shareholders.
This leaves no room for any other goals, including religious goals. As for
unincorporated for-profit businesses, it is true that persons engaged in such
businesses pursue profit. However, no legal duty requires them to only pursue
profit. They can pursue other goals, including religious goals, along with profit.
They may put religion over profit whenever the two conflict if they so desire. That
is not true in for-profit corporations, where placing religion over profit would
72.
Thus, the analysis will help answer both questions linked together under the
concept of corporate standing. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
73.
170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
74.
506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). The scope of circumstances in which the Revlon
duties apply has become quite narrow. See Lyman Johnson, The Dwindling of Revlon, 71
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 167 (2014).
75.
16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).
76.
See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 36 (1991); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The
Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 547 (2003); Jonathan R.
Macey, Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to Nonshareholder
Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1266 (1999).
For an overview, see David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J.
1013 (2013).
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violate the fiduciary duties owed to shareholders. Thus, it can make no legal sense
to say that a for-profit corporation has any sort of religious value as a defining
goal.77
Before responding to the shareholder conception, let us consider the other
leading corporate law argument for denying RFRA standing to for-profit
corporations. This is the argument from corporate personhood, articulated by a
number of prominent corporate law scholars in an amicus brief to the Supreme
Court in Hobby Lobby.78 The scholars argue that the corporations in Hobby Lobby
are trying to pass through the religious beliefs of their shareholders to the
corporation itself. However, one of the characteristics of a corporation is that it is
legally distinct from its shareholders. Shareholders are not responsible for the
liabilities of the corporation—one of the key benefits of the corporate form. 79 By
attributing the shareholders’ religious beliefs to the corporation, scholars argue,
shareholders want the benefits that a separate legal personality provides through
limited liability while ignoring that separate personality when seeking the
protection of RFRA.80

III. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING RFRA STANDING
Now we turn to what is wrong with these two arguments. This will lead
us to both a core liberal principle underlying the Hobby Lobby decision and a
framework for determining when corporations should be able to invoke RFRA
protection. Opposing the shareholder conception of corporate purpose and duty is a
liberal and progressive stakeholder vision of corporations as vehicles for pursuing
a variety of public goods while still achieving a return for shareholders. Opposing
the argument based on corporate personality, we will see that, although the
premise of a legal separation between the shareholders and the corporation is
completely correct, the conclusion that corporations cannot be vehicles for
pursuing religious purposes does not follow at all. The proposed framework for
analyzing RFRA standing has two dimensions. The first, and more important
dimension looks at the various degrees and forms of organizational commitment to
a religious purpose. The second dimension considers how the extent of
shareholding concentration in a limited number of shareholders with religious
commitments can also affect the analysis. Variations along each dimension can be
more or less supportive of RFRA standing, with the analysis being easy where
both dimensions either strongly support or discourage standing, and more difficult
where the dimensions are at cross purposes.

77.
Some judges in the lower court cases made this argument. See Conestoga
Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377,
385, (3d Cir. 2013); Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 626 (6th Cir. 2013).
78.
Brief for Corporate and Criminal Law Professors as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos.
13-354,
13-356),
2014
WL
333889,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefsv3/13-354-13-356_amcu_cclp.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter Amicus Brief].
79.
Id. at 6–8.
80.
Id. at 13–16.
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Let us start with the shareholder conception of the corporation and its
fiduciary duty argument. First, even if one accepts that there is an immutable
fiduciary duty to solely maximize shareholder returns, that need not necessarily
rule out other goals as important subsidiary purposes of a corporation. There are
many different ways to achieve the end of maximizing financial returns. In the vast
majority of real world situations, spotting a sharp conflict between profit
maximization and other plausible goals is nearly impossible because figuring out
what profit maximization entails is extraordinarily complicated and subject to
differing opinions. Recognizing this, courts use the business judgment rule
(acknowledged even in Dodge)81 to give boards much latitude in determining how
best to maximize profit.82 For instance, many believe that had Henry Ford simply
said he was giving his workers high wages as a way of maintaining loyalty and
high productivity, rather than explicitly saying he was ignoring profits in doing so,
the court would not have second-guessed his judgment.83
Similarly, for some corporations a religious goal and reputation might be
good business. If Hobby Lobby has deeply branded itself as a religious
corporation, it could well justify a decision that follows religious precepts by
sacrificing short-term profits. Such a decision may increase long-term profitability
by making its employees and customers more loyal. It may not, of course, but
courts applying the business judgment rule would defer to the judgment of the
directors and officers. For such a corporation, it might be the case that its religious
goal is strong and entrenched enough to grant it standing under RFRA. After all, if
that goal succeeds, it does so by attracting religiously minded employees,
consumers, and investors, inducing them to get involved with the corporation. It is
precisely such collective involvement with a shared religious purpose that the
extension of RFRA to organizations is intended to protect.84
But the fiduciary duty objection is more wrong than that. It seems highly
unlikely that the duty to maximize shareholder returns is immutable. If
shareholders agree to follow legally recognized methods, they should be able to
waive that duty and allow their corporation to pursue other goals potentially at
odds with maximizing profits. A core principle of American corporate law is that
most of its rules are defaults, which the corporation may opt out of when the
appropriate approval is received.85 Shareholders should be able to opt out of the
alleged duty by agreeing to a provision in the charter, bylaw, or shareholder

81.
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 682 (Mich. 1919).
82.
See Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Fiduciary Duties: The Emerging
Jurisprudence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 133, 135–
37 (2012); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57
VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004).
83.
M. Todd Henderson, Everything Old Is New Again: Lessons from Dodge v.
Ford Motor Company (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econs. Olin Working Paper No. 373, 2007),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1070284.
84.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014).
85.
See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 76; ROBERTA ROMANO, THE
GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993); Alan J. Meese & Nathan B. Oman, Hobby
Lobby, Corporate Law, and the Theory of the Firm: Why For-Profit Corporations Are
RFRA Persons, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 273, 277 (2014).
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agreement.86 Thus, a corporation that has adopted a charter provision stating that it
has as a core purpose87 to pursue Christian values would presumably be a prime
candidate for RFRA protection.
But we have still not plumbed the depth of error in the fiduciary duty
objection. The previous paragraph suggested that corporations may deviate from
the exclusive focus on shareholder wealth only if shareholders approve. Many,
including myself, do not believe that is a correct characterization. 88 We believe
that boards may validly consider and advance the interests of a variety of persons
associated with a corporation, including its employees, creditors, customers, and
suppliers—even if those interests lead to a reduction in profits. Moreover,
shareholders themselves may have interests other than maximizing their own
financial returns, and may want corporations in which they have invested to pursue
other goals.89 This is the stakeholder conception of the corporation, and is often
associated with those who are on the more liberal or progressive end of the
political spectrum.90 Here is where we see the first major liberal value embedded
within the Hobby Lobby decision.91

86.
Meese & Oman, supra note 85, at 281–83.
87.
I say “a core purpose,” not “its sole purpose.” Any for-profit corporation will
have as one of its purposes achieving a financial return for its shareholders. If it has no
intent to return any money at all to its shareholders, it can and should organize as a
nonprofit corporation or some other sort of entity.
88.
See Lee, supra note 13; LYNN A. STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH:
HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATION, AND THE PUBLIC
(2012); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,
85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999); Lyman Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History of
Corporate Responsibility: Corporate Personhood, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1135 (2012);
Johnson & Millon, supra note 12; McDonnell, supra note 12; David Millon, Two Model of
Corporate Social Responsibility, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 523 (2011).
89.
See Anne Tucker, The Citizen Shareholder: Modernizing the Agency
Paradigm to Reflect How and Why a Majority of Americans Invest in the Market, 35
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1299, 1318 n.85 (2012).
90.
PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, supra note 12. Several decades ago, a
leading practical expression of this viewpoint was the creation of corporate constituency
statutes, which explicitly allow corporations to pursue goals other than shareholder wealth
maximization. See Brett H. McDonnell, Corporate Constituency Statutes and Employee
Governance, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1227 (2004); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical
and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV.
579 (1992); Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency
Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14 (1992). Another practical expression has been the
movement to encourage corporations to behave in socially responsible ways. A very recent
practical expression is the creation of benefit corporation statutes, in which corporations can
affirmatively commit to pursuing goals other than shareholder wealth maximization. See
Brett H. McDonnell, Committing to Doing Good and Doing Well: Fiduciary Duty in Benefit
Corporations, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 19 (2014); Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in
Corporate Form: Corporate Law and Benefit Corps., 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 269, 279
(2012–2013); Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge in Corporate
Governance, 68 BUS. LAW. 1007, 1021–22 (2013); William H. Clark, Jr. et al., White
Paper: The Need and Rationale for the Benefit Corporation: Why It Is the Legal Form that
Best Addresses the Need of Social Entrepreneurs, Investors, and, Ultimately, the Public (on
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Scholars have endlessly debated whether the stakeholder or shareholder
conception of the corporation better characterizes American corporate law. As to
the leading state, Delaware, Christopher Bruner’s take on the enduring
ambivalence of Delaware on this point is persuasive.92 That is, Delaware case law
vacillates between the shareholder and stakeholder conceptions, with proponents
of each side able to quote authority in their favor. 93 But over half of the states have
adopted a corporate constituency statute, which explicitly allows directors to
consider the interests of enumerated stakeholders. 94 Although a cramped reading of
these statutes is conceivable, it seems pretty clear that in these states the
stakeholder conception has triumphed.
Shortly, I shall argue that it has triumphed in Justice Alito’s majority
opinion as well. If one accepts the stakeholder conception of the corporation, then
the fiduciary duty objection to RFRA standing collapses completely. No sort of
duty requires those acting on behalf of corporations to pursue shareholder wealth
maximization as their only goal. Moreover, if this conception is right, it should
lead courts to recognize corporations as adopting a religious purpose more readily
than if one prefers the previous responses to the duty objection. There is no need to
point to any sort of potential long-term benefit to shareholders in justifying the
religious goal. Nor is there any need to show that shareholders have formally
approved the shareholder goal. Moreover, the analysis is not limited to closely held
corporations—public corporations are also allowed to pursue goals other than
shareholder wealth maximization. There is still the question of determining when a
corporation has actually adopted such a goal, but a broad array of indicators may
point to the conclusion that it has done so. We shall explore these soon.
But first, let us consider the flaws in the argument against RFRA standing
based on separate corporate personality. 95 A limited response to this is that
occasionally corporate law disregards the separation between the shareholders and
the corporation. When a court does so, it is said to have pierced the corporate veil.
Courts pierce the veil where one or a few shareholders totally dominate a
corporation, and where they have abused the corporate form in a way that unfairly
hurts others. When this happens, the court ignores the usual rule of limited
liability, and allows creditors of the corporation to collect unpaid debts from the
controlling shareholder.96

file with author). It is notable that the Court cites the example of benefit corporations to
illustrate that a pure shareholder focus is not required in corporation law. Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014).
91.
Assuming that this view is indeed embedded within the majority opinion. I
shall argue that it is the first major liberal value. See infra notes 120–43 and accompanying
text.
92.
Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59
ALA. L. REV. 1385 (2008).
93.
See id.
94.
McDonnell, supra note 90; Orts, supra note 90; Mitchell, supra note 90.
95.
See Amicus Brief, supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text.
96.
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479,
481 (2001); John H. Matheson, Why Courts Pierce: An Empirical Study of Piercing the
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With RFRA, one might on occasion decide to pierce in the opposite
direction. That is, instead of allowing creditors to treat a debt that belongs to the
corporation as belonging to its shareholders as well, one might attribute a free
exercise right that belongs to the shareholders as belonging to the corporation. One
would do so only in the rare circumstances where there are a very few shareholders
who are fully identified with the corporation itself. Indeed, there are a few
instances outside of RFRA where courts have engaged in such “reverse veilpiercing.”97 Stephen Bainbridge has argued for using reverse veil-piercing in the
RFRA context.98 The corporate law scholars who wrote the amicus brief think that
veil-piercing is inappropriate.99 Bainbridge is seemingly right in stating that we
disregard corporate personality on occasion, but it is rare. If this were the only
response to the corporate personhood argument, it would lead to recognizing
corporate standing under RFRA in only a few extreme cases.
But, there is a much more robust response to the argument. Corporate
personhood is not really an argument that corporations cannot have a religious
purpose. Rather, it is an argument against inferring such a purpose from the
individual beliefs of its shareholders. Doing so misconceives the relationship
between shareholders and corporations. But, recognizing the importance of
separate corporate personality in no way rules out the possibility that a religious
purpose may be inferred via other means. In particular, the body that has most
authority to make decisions and determine corporate strategies and purposes is the
board of directors.100 Should the board choose to declare the religious purpose of a
corporation, nothing at all in the argument from corporate personality would seem
to argue against recognizing that board declaration.
Pulling the discussion of fiduciary duty and corporate personality
together, the best articulation of a theory of corporations that fits within a liberal or
progressive vision is probably the team production model of Margaret Blair and
Lynn Stout.101 Under this theory, the board acts as a mediating hierarch that guides
the general direction of the corporation, taking into account the shared and
competing interests of a variety of groups that contribute resources to the
corporation. The board’s fiduciary duty does not focus exclusively on maximizing
shareholder wealth. The corporation is indeed quite separate from shareholders,
and it is the board that makes the big policy decisions that define the corporation.
Is there no way in which shareholders are singled out, given that they do
elect the board, and have a few other important powers, such as approving charter
amendments, the ability to amend the bylaws on their own, and the ability to enter
Corporate Veil, 7 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 1, 3–4 (2010); Richard B. Thompson, Piercing the
Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1036 (1991).
97.
See Cargill, Inc. v. Hedge, 375 N.W.2d 477 (Minn. 1985); State Bank in
Eden Valley v. Euerle Farms, Inc., 441 N.W.2d 121 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); see generally
Gregory S. Crespi, The Reverse Pierce Doctrine: Applying Appropriate Standards, 16 J.
CORP. L. 33 (1990).
98.
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Using Reverse Veil Piercing to Vindicate the Free
Exercise Rights of Incorporated Employers, 16 GREEN BAG 2d 235 (2013).
99.
Amicus Brief, supra note 78.
100.
Bainbridge, supra note 76, at 559.
101.
Blair & Stout, supra note 88.
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into shareholder agreements that can bind the corporation? Here, I may deviate a
bit from the pure team production theory, which goes pretty far in trying to
minimize the import of the shareholder role. 102 Those just-mentioned shareholder
powers are significant and go beyond what other constituent groups, such as
creditors and employees, have. In fact, in closely held corporations—not the
intended subject for the team production theory103—those powers often mean that
a few shareholders have full control over the corporation, particularly because the
same shareholders typically serve as directors and officers as well. Thus, although
one should focus on the actions and statements of the board to determine a
corporation’s purpose, the shareholders (and officers) may matter as well—
especially in closely held corporations. A corporation with just a few related
shareholders who are deeply committed to the same religious beliefs may well be
more deeply and effectively committed to a religious purpose than an otherwise
similar corporation with a more divided and diluted group of shareholders.
This theory of the goals and power structure of corporations should be
agreeable to liberals for a few reasons. It allows corporations to pursue a wide
variety of goals, creating space for corporations to engage in socially responsible
behavior. It also deemphasizes the importance and authority of shareholders and
puts more focus on the role of other groups (such as employees) and, insofar as
liberals tend to champion those with relatively less wealth and power, liberal
sympathy tends to lie with some of those groups.104
Next, I shall propose a suggested framework for determining whether a
corporation should have standing under RFRA. Then, I shall compare that
framework with what the Court says in Hobby Lobby.
Consider two dimensions of religious commitment by a corporation:
organizational and ownership. The more important dimension focuses on
organizational rules and practices.105 Consistent with the basic structure of
corporate law, the board is primarily responsible for these rules and practices,
although officers may determine some of them (subject to the board’s oversight
and approval). A few of the most formal and foundational rules are subject to
shareholder approval.
Organizational rules and practices can be more or less authoritative and
controlling. The most authoritative rule would be a provision in the corporate

102.
See Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Law and the Team Production Problem, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 33, 43–44 (Claire A. Hill &
Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012).
103.
Blair and Stout refer repeatedly to “public corporations” as the type of entity
that they are explaining. See Blair & Stout, supra note 88. For a brief discussion of the
distinction between closely held and public corporations, see infra notes 113–18 and
accompanying text.
104.
See Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L.
REV. 283 (1998); McDonnell, supra note 12; Marleen A. O’Connor, The Human Capital
Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78
CORNELL L. REV. 899 (1993).
105.
I will call this the “organizational dimension.”
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charter, which must be approved by both the board and shareholders. 106 Slightly
less authoritative would be a provision in the bylaws, which may be approved by
either the board or the shareholders on their own. 107 Shareholders may also enter
into agreements that can bind the corporation.108 These are the three main formal
powers that shareholders have that are relevant for setting corporate policy, beyond
electing the board. Recall that on some conceptions of corporate duty and purpose,
formal shareholder approval is required to deviate from the shareholder wealth
maximization default, so that only these sorts of rules would suffice to establish a
religious purpose.109
A broader stakeholder theory of the corporation does not require such
formal shareholder approval, and, thus, other sorts of rules and practices may be
enough to establish a religious purpose. Boards may adopt policy or value
statements that proclaim a corporation’s commitment to religious values. Their
choice of goods or services produced or sold (or not sold) may deliberately reflect
religious values. They may enter into agreements that commit them to courses of
action or constraints that reflect religious values. They may make charitable
commitments that reflect their values. They may market themselves to consumers,
employees, and/or investors based on their religious values. They may make
formal disclosures or more informal public statements proclaiming their values.
And so on. There is obviously a rich array of possibilities. For any particular
corporation, one can consider the totality of circumstances and ask how firmly,
formally, broadly, and pervasively that corporation has used this array of methods
to proclaim and commit to a set of religious values.
Ownership is the other dimension of corporate religious commitment. It is
less important than the organizational dimension, but it does matter given the role
of shareholders within the corporation, including both their position as the body
that elects the board and their role in amendments to the charter and bylaws.110
There are several factors that will drive how strongly committed the shareholders
are to a religious purpose. One factor is the sincerity and strength of the religious
commitment of individual shareholders. Another factor is the degree that share
ownership is concentrated in one or a few shareholders. A corporation with just
one or two shareholders who are deeply committed to religious values is more
106.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (2015); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.03
(2010).
107.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.20.
108.
What is required for such agreements to be legally binding on the
corporation varies by state. Of particular note is whether the agreement must be signed by
all shareholders, or only shareholders holding a majority of the outstanding shares. See, e.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 350 (agreement of majority of shares may bind close corporation);
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.32 (agreement must be signed by all shareholders).
109.
See Meese & Oman, supra note 85, at 284–85; see also notes 85–88 and
accompanying text. An interesting question would be what weight if any to give to
nonauthoritative shareholder expressions of purpose, e.g., policy statement made in a
nonbinding Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposal. On my approach, such a statement would
carry some weight, but probably not very much. For a description of the 14a-8 shareholder
proposal process, see Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC, Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14 (CF) (2001),
http://www.sec.gov/pdf/cfs1614.pdf.
110.
See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
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likely to remain committed to those values. For the same reason, the total number
of shareholders is also relevant. Another factor is to what extent a liquid market
exists for a corporation’s shares. If there is such a market, the current shareholder
base is more prone to turnover as time goes by, so that even if the current
shareholders are highly religious, there is a greater chance that future shareholders
may not be.
Corporate law has several related but separate concepts that help
distinguish important variations in the ownership dimension. From the veilpiercing doctrine comes the notion of an alter ego, where one shareholder so
dominates the corporation that there is no real distinction between that shareholder
and the corporation.111 Moving towards a lesser degree of concentration, there is
the notion of a controlling shareholder or controlling group.112 This occurs where
one person or closely related group owns enough shares that they can effectively
control the corporation; they can elect a majority of the board. Control of a
majority of the outstanding shares is generally a sufficient but not necessary
condition for such control. Another idea is that of a closely held corporation,113
which the Court frequently invokes in Hobby Lobby. The idea of a closely held
corporation is somewhat nebulous, although some states do have special rules for
close corporations that provide a more precise legal definition.114 The two defining
features of a closely held corporation are: (1) a relatively small number of
shareholders and (2) no active market for the shares (indeed, those statutes which
define close corporations typically require that shares must be subject to transfer
restrictions).115 In contrast, shares of a public corporation are traded on a public
market.116 Note that a closely held corporation need not have any controlling
shareholder or group,117 while a public corporation may have a controlling
shareholder.118

111.
See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
112.
Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance:
Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (2006); Ronald J.
Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785
(2003).
113.
MICHAEL S. LONG & THOMAS A. BRYANT, VALUING THE CLOSELY HELD FIRM
(2007); Robert B. Thompson, Allocating the Roles for Contracts and Judges in the Closely
Held Firm, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 369 (2011).
114.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342 (2015).
115.
See, e.g., id. § 342(a)(2).
116.
See James J. Park, Two Trends in the Regulation of the Public Corporation,
7 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L. J. 429 (2012); Hillary A. Sale, The New “Public”
Corporation, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 138 (2011).
117.
For instance, even with as few as two shareholders, there may be no
controlling shareholder if each owns an equal number of shares (or each has the right to
elect an equal number of directors) and the two shareholders are in conflict with each other
(this is not an ideal share ownership situation, by the way).
118.
In 2010, for instance, the two founders of Google still controlled 59% of the
voting share rights of that company. Tom Krazit, Google Founders to Sell Stock, Cede
Majority
Control
by
2014,
CNET
(Jan.
22,
2010,
5:39
PM),
http://www.cnet.com/news/google-founders-to-sell-stock-cede-majority-control-by-2014/.

2015]

HOBBY LOBBY

799

Let us bring together these two dimensions to suggest a framework for
determining when a corporation should be able to claim RFRA standing. In both
organizational and ownership dimensions, a corporation may show a stronger or
weaker degree of commitment to a religious purpose and values. How do those
two dimensions interact?
Concentrated religious
ownership

No religious ownership

Strong organizational
commitment to religion

Strongest case for standing

Possible standing

I

II

No organizational
commitment to religion

Possible standing

No standing

III

IV

Table 1: Framework for Determining RFRA Standing.
Consider four extreme cases, illustrated in Table 1, depending upon
whether each dimension shows either a quite strong or a quite weak commitment
to a religious purpose. The best case for RFRA standing occurs where both
dimensions show a strong commitment, as in box I of Table 1. Imagine a family
corporation with just a few family members who own all of the shares, with no
history or prospect of any sort of market in those shares, and where all
shareholders have a sincere and strong commitment to the same specific religion.
The corporation has adopted a charter provision declaring that its decisions will be
guided by the beliefs of that religion, the corporation has repeatedly and publicly
proclaimed this commitment in a variety of settings, the service it provides is
closely linked to a religious identity, and, as a result of all these commitments,
most employees and customers identify with the same religious beliefs. This is the
strongest case for granting RFRA standing. In such a corporation, it is not just the
shareholders who are likely to look to the corporation as a way of acting on their
religious beliefs, but also many of the employees and customers. The commitment
is deep and long-lasting, making it more likely that the corporation will attract
similar believers and reducing the likelihood that it is claiming a religious purpose
under RFRA as a deceptive way of achieving a commercial advantage. If courts
are to grant any for-profit corporation standing under RFRA (and Hobby Lobby
indicates they will) this is the clearest kind of example of a case where doing so
would be appropriate.
Consider the other end of the spectrum, a corporation with no signs of
religious commitment on either dimension as in box IV of Table 1. Imagine a
public corporation with no shareholder holding more than a few percentage points
of the shares, and an active share market on the New York Stock Exchange with
heavy turnover. No official policy, statement, or settled practice shows any sign of
a commitment to any religious purpose. Clearly, such a corporation cannot claim
standing under RFRA, not even if it tried to claim a sudden St. Paul conversion
moment.
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More interesting and difficult are the other two cases where a corporation
shows a strong religious commitment on one dimension but not the other. Given
that the organizational dimension is generally more important under corporate law
and theory than the ownership dimension, 119 let us turn to the case where a
corporation has a strong commitment on the organizational dimension but not the
ownership dimension (as in box II of Table 1). Imagine a corporation that was
owned by a religious family in its early stages, with a religious purpose bylaw, a
well-publicized religious vision statement, and products and policies that show a
clear commitment to religious values. As a result, the company’s directors,
officers, and many of its employees and customers share the founders’ strong
religious beliefs. However, the founders recently gave up their controlling share
position, either by selling out to a company with no religious commitment or by
going public and selling enough shares to divest the founding family members of a
controlling block.
In this example, the lack of commitment in the ownership dimension does
matter. It matters in part because it means that the shareholders themselves are not
expressing their religious values through their involvement in the organization, so
that is one important constituent group for which RFRA standing serves no
purpose.120 Moreover, the ownership situation unsettles the strength of
commitment found in the organizational dimension. If the new shareholders
become disillusioned with the religious commitment of this corporation, they may
replace the directors with a more secularly-minded board, which in turn may
revoke the various statements and practices that constitute the company’s ongoing
commitment to a religious purpose. Indeed, the rarity (perhaps complete
nonexistence)121 of a corporation fitting this hypothetical situation suggests that
public corporations face strong practical pressure to focus on shareholder financial
value.
However, that does not necessarily imply that RFRA standing is
inappropriate in this case. If the commitments along the organizational dimension
are strong enough, this may remain a religious enough corporation. Even if the
shareholders are not religious, the directors, officers, employees, and customers
are, so the religious values of many individuals are still being pursued through this
corporation. Moreover, the commitment may remain quite strong and unlikely to
119.
See Bainbridge, supra note 76; Blair & Stout, supra note 88.
120.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014).
121.
I am not aware of a corporation that currently fits this description. Chik-fil-A
could someday do so—it is a large, profitable corporation with a strong Christian
commitment. Currently it is closely held, but its finances are such that it is certainly a
candidate for going public someday. However, its religious commitments may make its
shareholders reluctant to do so. See Zach Spiegel, Chik-fil-A IPO Update, WEALTH DAILY
(Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.wealthdaily.com/articles/chick-fil-a-ipo-update/5420. A
nonreligious example from the liberal world of social responsibility may be Ben & Jerry’s,
which began as a corporation dedicated to various social causes, but eventually sold out to
the large multinational corporation Unilever. The terms of the sale tried to maintain an
independent culture of social responsibility within Ben & Jerry’s as a subsidiary of
Unilever. However, that arrangement has been, at best, modestly successful. See Antony
Page & Robert A. Katz, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate Law and the Sale of a Social
Enterprise Icon, 35 VA. TECH. L. REV. 211 (2010).
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be changed. The shareholders may find that attacking that commitment is a
suicidal business strategy. Insofar as the commitment is embodied in ongoing
contracts, it may take time to be able to withdraw from them. In the case of public
share ownership, the shareholders may well find the costs of organizing to replace
the board prohibitive.122 Depending upon the precise facts, RFRA standing may be
appropriate; though, where the ownership dimension is weak, one does require
particularly strong commitment on the organizational dimension.
Finally, consider the case where commitment is weak on the
organizational dimension but strong in ownership. Imagine a family corporation
owned by just a couple of committed Christian family members, whose shared
beliefs are sincere and strong. However, they have in the past shown no particular
religious purpose in their business, although they have not caused the business to
behave in any way that violates their religious beliefs. Now a new law would force
them to violate a strongly held belief. Of course, the corporation can always adopt
a formal policy after the issue has arisen, but one should perhaps be more skeptical
of such post hoc actions. Conestoga Wood Specialties in the Hobby Lobby case
itself may not be too far off from this description—at least as described by the
Supreme Court. Although its shareholder family was certainly composed of
committed Christians, the number and formality of organizational commitments to
a Christian purpose was pretty meager.123 Should the corporation be able to claim
standing under RFRA?
This is the hardest case of the four. The greater importance of the
organizational dimension—which derives from both the stakeholder conception of
the corporation with respect to duty124 and from a recognition of distinct corporate
personality125—suggests not giving RFRA standing here. If these owners meant to
use this business as a vehicle for pursuing their religious beliefs, why have they
given no sign of it among the many sorts of practices that we consider on the
organizational dimension? We should be able to find some degree of religious
commitment along the organizational dimension if we are to grant RFRA standing,
although the degree of commitment can certainly be more modest where the
ownership dimension shows a strong commitment.
But perhaps in rare circumstances we might want to grant RFRA standing
to such a corporation. The rationale would be along veil-piercing lines, where we
see the corporation as essentially an extension of the dominant owner(s). 126 Even if
such owners are not affirmatively using the business to advance their religious
values, they may see those values as imposing strong moral constraints on what
they are willing to do, even if in the past those constraints have not been visibly
binding. Indeed, insofar as we encourage socially responsible corporations, we
want to encourage owners who recognize such moral constraints on the behavior

122.
See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver J. Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free Rider
Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation, 11 BELL J. ECON. 42 (1980).
123.
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t Health & Human
Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013).
124.
See supra notes 81-91 and accompanying text.
125.
See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
126.
See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
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of the businesses they own.127 Where the beliefs are sincere, and the burden on
those beliefs is significant, we should be willing to consider an accommodation for
such a corporation. But in the absence of any sort of significant commitment at the
organizational level, this case is (at best) an extremely tenuous candidate for
RFRA standing. Of course, once the issue has been identified, the shareholders of
such a corporation can move to create the necessary organizational commitment,
which could eliminate the dilemma supposed in this hypothesized situation.
However, we may often be skeptical of such after-the-fact rationalizations,
especially in cases (unlike Hobby Lobby, it appears) where the corporation may
gain monetarily from seeking a religious accommodation. In such cases, a court
could credit such belated commitments only where they appear to commit the
corporation to profit-decreasing as well as profit-increasing actions.
I have just suggested a framework for deciding when a corporation should
be able to claim standing under RFRA. The guiding concept is an inquiry into the
extent to which a corporation has committed itself, legally and practically, to a
religious purpose that helps shape its decision-making. One should consider both
the organizational dimension and the ownership dimension in determining a
corporation’s degree of commitment, assigning more importance to the
organizational dimension. This framework is grounded in corporate law and
theory, and fits well with a perspective on corporate law that is often associated
with political liberals or progressives. It provides more of a legal standard than a
bright line rule, and will not always lead to clear answers. The result will depend
upon the totality of the circumstances. However, it does identify the major factors
one should consider, and in concert with well-understood concepts of corporate
law, it should provide some handy guidance most of the time.

IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S OPINION FITS WITHIN THIS
FRAMEWORK
To what extent does this framework reflect the approach of the Hobby
Lobby opinion? I believe the framework fits the opinion quite well. I acknowledge
that the fit is not perfect. The Supreme Court did not develop a full-fledged theory,
but rather went only as far as it needed in order to address the facts in front of it.
Even then, it may not have gone far enough. Supreme Court justices are not chosen
for their expertise in corporate law, and it shows. The opinion is rather vague and
imprecise, and contains elements of several different approaches to corporate law.
In fact, a plausible claim can be made that the Court has sided with any one of
several different understandings of corporations.128 Nonetheless, the approach

127.
See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
128.
See Stephen J. Padfield, Corporate Social Responsibility and Concession
Theory, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1, 25 (2015); Alan Meese, Hobby Lobby and
Corporate Social Responsibility: A View from the Right, THE CONGLOMERATE (July 16,
2014),
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2014/07/hobby-lobby-and-corporate-socialresponsibility-a-view-from-the-right.html.
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outlined here fits the Hobby Lobby opinion at least as well as, and probably better
than, all competing approaches.129
In attempting to decipher the majority opinion’s theory of the corporation,
we should look to both its general statements of how corporations should be
understood within RFRA, and its description of the facts surrounding the plaintiff
corporations in Hobby Lobby itself. As to the former, there are two extended
passages of particular note. The first states:
Congress provided protection for people like the Hahns and Greens
by employing a familiar legal fiction: It included corporations
within RFRA’s definition of “persons.” But it is important to keep
in mind that the purpose of this fiction is to provide protection for
human beings. A corporation is simply a form of organization used
by human beings to achieve desired ends. An established body of
law specifies the rights and obligations of the people (including
shareholders, officers, and employees) who are associated with a
corporation in one way or another. When rights, whether
constitutional or statutory, are extended to corporations, the purpose
is to protect the rights of these people. . . protecting the free-exercise
rights of corporations like Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel
protects the religious liberty of the humans who own and control
those companies.130

When this passage speaks of the people who are associated with a
corporation, it lists not only shareholders, but also officers and employees.131 This
suggests more of a stakeholder conception of the corporation, not a shareholder
conception. The end of the passage does narrow its focus to “the humans who own
and control those companies.”132 However, that, in part, reflects the fact that the
corporations in the case, to which the beginning of that sentence refers, are closely
held corporations with just five shareholders, who are also the directors and
officers. And even this narrower sentence points to those who “own and control”
the companies, which includes directors and officers, not just shareholders.
Immediately following this passage, the majority opinion cites the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals’s opinion below,133 which made the argument based on
separate corporate personhood. Justice Alito replied by acknowledging the reality
and importance of separate corporate personhood, but dismissed the argument as
“quite beside the point,” reasoning that: “Corporations, ‘separate and apart from’
the human beings who own, run, and are employed by them, cannot do anything at
all.”134 The Court thereby acknowledges the law of separate corporate personhood,
129.
For a similar characterization of the decision, see Johnson & Millon, supra
note 12.
130.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014).
131.
Any corporate law junkie reading this will wonder why directors are not on
that list, thus illustrating that the U.S. Supreme Court is most emphatically not the Delaware
Supreme Court.
132.
Id.
133.
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t Health & Human
Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 385 (3d Cir. 2013).
134.
Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
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but says that law is used for various purposes to advance the interests of those
involved in the corporation. In applying RFRA, the point is not to identify the
corporation with its shareholders, but rather to determine whether granting RFRA
standing is consistent with the goals and structure of the corporation in question. In
pointing to the human beings who make up a corporation, the Court specifically
mentions “the human beings who own, run, and are employed by them,”135 once
again going well beyond shareholders. This whole passage is highly consistent
with my response above to the argument from separate corporate personality. 136
The other general statement of note appears several pages later, and
considers the fiduciary duty argument against RFRA standing. It too deserves
extended quotation:
Some lower court judges have suggested that RFRA does not
protect for-profit corporations because the purpose of such
corporations is simply to make money. This argument flies in the
face of modern corporate law. “Each American jurisdiction today
either expressly or by implication authorizes corporation to be
formed under its general corporation act for any lawful purpose or
business.” While it is certainly true that a central objective of forprofit corporations is to make money, modern corporate law does
not require for-profit corporations to pursue profit at the expense of
everything else, and many do not do so. For-profit corporations,
with ownership approval, support a wide variety of charitable
causes, and it is not at all uncommon for such corporations to
further humanitarian and other altruistic objectives. Many examples
come readily to mind. So long as its owners agree, a for-profit
corporation may take costly pollution-control and energyconservation measures that go beyond what the law requires. A forprofit corporation that operates facilities in other countries may
exceed the requirements of local law regarding working conditions
and benefits. If for-profit corporations may pursue such worthy
objectives, there is no apparent reason why they may not further
religious objectives as well.137

This paragraph, for the most part, works as a ringing endorsement of the
stakeholder conception of the corporation that many liberals and progressives
prefer. It certainly denies the existence of an immutable duty to only consider the
financial interests of shareholders, requiring corporate directors and officers to
justify any other sorts of goals as helping to maximize profit in the long run. 138
The passage does show some ambiguity between weaker and stronger
understandings of the stakeholder conception.139 Recall that a weak understanding
asserts that a profit-maximization-only goal is the default rule, and opting out of it
requires explicit shareholder approval,140 whereas a stronger stakeholder
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
See supra notes 95–100 and accompanying text.
Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2770–71.
See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text.
See Pollman, supra note 54.
See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
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conception asserts that an exclusive focus on profit-maximization is not the default
rule, so that shareholder approval is not required to consider other goals. 141 The
beginning and end of the quoted passage assert the validity of purposes other than
shareholder profit without any qualifiers concerning shareholder approval,
suggesting the stronger stakeholder conception. However, in the middle of the
passage there are two references to “owner” approval, which could suggest a
weaker conception. The first of those references states that “[f]or-profit
corporations, with ownership approval, support a wide variety of charitable causes,
and it is not at all uncommon for such corporations to further humanitarian and
other altruistic objectives.”142 Although this passage could be read to suggest that
ownership approval is required in order to give to charity, 143 it need not be
understood that way. The reference to ownership approval may simply be pointing
out that in many cases the shareholders themselves are happy for the corporation to
behave charitably, so that shareholders and the beneficiaries can both benefit. Note
that many, probably most, corporations that engage in charitable giving do not
obtain any sort of explicit shareholder approval, neither for specific instances of
giving nor for the general power to give. So this example is not a very good one
for the weak stakeholder conception (requiring explicit shareholder approval for
nonprofit goals) as an explanation of actual corporate law and behavior.
The second reference to shareholder approval is admittedly stronger
evidence that the Court has in mind only the weak stakeholder conception: “So
long as its owners agree, a for-profit corporation may take costly pollution-control
and energy-conservation measures that go beyond what the law requires.”144 That
“so long as” does indeed suggest that without owner approval, a for-profit
corporation could not take such profit-reducing measures.145 However, that is only
one sentence within the quoted passage above, and the other sentences seem to
suggest the stronger stakeholder conception.
More tellingly, the Court’s application of its reasoning to the facts in the
cases before it in Hobby Lobby is more consistent with the strong than the weak
stakeholder conception. Indeed, on the weak conception, it is not at all clear that
the corporations behaved appropriately, or even legally, to the extent that they
reduced profits in order to advance religious goals. For the Conestoga Wood
Specialties Corporation, the Court points to several statements from the
shareholders themselves, apparently prepared for trial. It also points to a company
“Vision and Values Statement,” with no indication that the shareholders acting as
shareholders approved the statement, and to a board-adopted “Statement on the
Sanctity of Human Life.”146 In Hobby Lobby, there were two corporations owned
by the same family. For these corporations, the Court points to a company
statement of purpose, pledges signed by the family members to run the business in

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text.
Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2771 (emphasis added).
See Meese, supra note 128; Padfield, supra note 128.
Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2771 (emphasis added).
See Meese, supra note 128; Padfield, supra note 128.
Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2764–65.
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accordance with their religious beliefs, and various religious practices adopted by
the companies.147
Thus, for none of the three corporations does the Court point to any action
taken by the shareholders, while acting as shareholders and following corporate
law procedures for shareholder action (e.g., charter amendments, bylaw
amendments, or shareholder agreements). 148 The weak stakeholder conception
would seem to require such formal shareholder approval for a deviation from the
profit-maximization default rule.149 Perhaps that does not matter in a case like this,
where the roles of shareholders, directors, and officers overlap completely, and
where it is clear that each individual shareholder does agree with the religious
goals. As a matter of corporate law, that should not make a difference. Corporate
law prescribes the ways in which shareholders can act where their approval is
required for a corporate action.150 If the shareholders have not acted in such a
legally recognized way, then the requisite approval has not been obtained. 151
It is possible that the Court holds to the weak stakeholder conception but
was simply not aware of the need for corporate formalities. Or, perhaps the Court
decided that for purposes of RFRA standing, it did not need to require such
formality and could recognize the necessary shareholder approval more informally,
since in the cases at hand, it was clear that all of the shareholders did in fact
approve.152 But the Court gives no indication that it is introducing its own variant
of corporate law for this particular setting. Nor would it be wise for the Court to
stray from the requirements of state corporate law in interpreting RFRA. For one
thing, the federal courts have no expertise in corporate law, and are unlikely to
make sensible choices if they stray from the established state law system. More
fundamentally, looking to state law is the conceptually proper inquiry. Recall that
the point of this inquiry is to determine what the agreed-upon goals of a
corporation are, because an organization that has adopted an adequately strong
religious purpose will attract to it persons who want to advance that purpose
through their actions within the corporation.153 In determining what the purposes
of an organization are, we do not simply add up the individual preferences of
147.
Id. at 2765–66.
148.
The three listed mechanisms are the ways in which shareholders can exercise
their collective powers. There are formal voting requirements for the adoption and
amendment of both certificates and articles, see e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (2015);
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.03 (2010) and bylaws, see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109;
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.20. Shareholder agreements (not contained in the articles or
bylaws) that bind the corporation must be in writing and signed by the requisite number,
which varies from holders of a majority of the voting power, see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 350 to a unanimity requirement, see, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.32(b).
149.
See Meese & Oman, supra note 85, at 282; Alan Meese, Discerning
Shareholder Consent to Profit-Reducing Religious Exercise, THE CONGLOMERATE (July 18,
2014), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2014/07/i-have-previously-suggested-along-withmy-co-author-nate-oman-that-profit-maximization-is-a-default-rule-whichshareholder.html.
150.
See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
151.
Meese, supra note 128.
152.
Id.
153.
See supra notes 63–69 and accompanying text.
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those human beings involved in the organization; we look to the defining rules of
the organization to ask what its purposes are, and who has the authority to define
them. For a corporation, the state corporate law statutes and case law set the core
legal framework for those defining rules, and the documents and practices of
particular corporations set their purposes operating within the state law rules that
constitute corporations. Thus, the state law rules are precisely where the federal
courts should look in determining the RFRA standing of a corporation. The
majority in Hobby Lobby shows no sign whatsoever that it thinks it is ignoring the
relevant state law rules,154 and we should not lightly assume that it is doing so. The
Court’s attribution of a religious purpose given the facts of the case in front of it is
most easily justified legally under a strong stakeholder conception of the
corporation, and we should take the opinion as, at least to some extent, an
endorsement of that conception. 155
One other facet of the opinion worth noting is its repeated reference to
closely held corporations. Some have taken this as a sign that only closely held
corporations may claim an exemption under RFRA. Most notable of those drawing
this inference are the agencies that implement the ACA. In their proposed revision
to the definition of “eligible organizations” that can claim an accommodation to
the contraceptive requirement, the agencies limit RFRA protection to closely held
corporations.156 This is certainly inconsistent with the corporate law and theory
reviewed in Part III. It also does not follow from the Supreme Court’s opinion. It is
true that the three corporations at issue in that case were all closely held, and in a
proper exercise of judicial prudence the Court did not extend its reasoning well
beyond the facts of the case in front of it. The Court does note that getting
shareholders in a public corporation to agree to a religious purpose is improbable,
and thus it is unlikely that many, if any, public corporations will adopt the kind of
commitments that would make them eligible for a RFRA accommodation. 157 It
then states “we have no occasion in these cases to consider RFRA’s applicability
to such companies.”158 That does not mean the Court concluded that only closely
held corporations may claim a RFRA accommodation. As we have seen, the
fundamental corporate law principles that govern all U.S. business corporations,
and which the Court repeatedly refers to, dictate that should a public corporation

154.
Indeed, it repeatedly points to state corporate law. See Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2770–72, 2775 (2014).
155.
It is certainly possible, indeed probable, that the Court is rather vague as to
the legal and conceptual distinctions that matter to corporate law scholars such as myself,
and so its factual analysis in this case may have missed the important question of whether
and how formal shareholder approval was expressed. In that instance, my argument should
be taken as an attempt at a deeper elaboration of the Court’s position that goes more
explicitly into the relevant corporate law issues and reveals the conception that best fits both
what the Court does say and also the facts of the case.
156.
Coverage of Certain Preventive Services under the Affordable Care Act, 79
Fed. Reg. 5118-01 (proposed Aug. 27, 2014) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R.
pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).
157.
Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2774.
158.
Id.
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choose to commit to a religious purpose, that would be as legitimate and valid as a
closely held corporation doing so.159
Thus, the majority decision in Hobby Lobby fits well with the framework
for determining RFRA standing elaborated here, which in turn fits well with the
prevailing progressive conception of the corporation. It includes a strong
stakeholder conception of corporate purpose and duty, wherein corporations and
their officers and directors have much freedom to adopt and pursue goals other
than maximizing the financial returns of shareholders. Separate corporate
personality is recognized but not fetishized. That is, corporations are not identified
with their shareholders, but rather seen as a collective organization in which a
variety of constituencies work together to further their own interests and
conceptions of the good. We look to how a corporation has defined its purposes to
determine whether a particular corporation has adopted enough of a religious
purpose for it to appropriately claim standing under RFRA. Shareholder ownership
and beliefs play a role in this analysis—inevitably so, given the authority that
shareholders have in corporate law (especially the authority to elect directors, as
well as the authority to set rules in the charter and bylaws). While the various roles
of shareholders, directors, and officers tend to blend together in corporations like
Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and Conestoga Wood, other sources of organizational
commitment are equally, if not more important. Corporate law liberals may not
identify with the sorts of religious commitments one finds in this case. However,
they should very much identify with, and approve of, corporations that have so
visibly and consciously chosen to pursue their visions of the public good along
with profit. As compared with the kind of socially responsible corporations that
progressives lionize and want to enable through the law, 160 Hobby Lobby is very
similar—it is just its particular vision of the public good, and the source of that
vision, that differs.
It is thus a shame, and somewhat puzzling, that the prevailing liberal and
progressive response to the corporate standing element of Hobby Lobby has been
so hostile.161 I note in conclusion on this element that there is serious tension
between two different liberal complaints about corporate standing. One of these
complaints, seen best in the corporate law professor amicus brief, 162 is concerned
that the Court gives too much emphasis to the beliefs of individual shareholders,
ignoring the importance of separate corporate personality. A more popular
complaint is that the Court’s rationale for granting standing is not as limited as the
Court claims. Even though the Court stresses at several points that its analysis in
the opinion only applies to closely held corporations, many fear that the Court’s
reasoning may eventually sweep further, and note that the Court does not define

159.
For a similar analysis and critique of the proposed definition of eligible
organization, see Lyman Johnson et al., Comments on the HHS’ Flawed Post-Hobby Lobby
Rules
(UCLA
Sch.
Of
Law
Research
Paper
No.
14-18,
2014),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2512860.
160.
See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text.
161.
See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text.
162.
See Amicus Brief, supra note 78.
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what it means by “closely held.”163 This second complaint is right—for the most
part. The Court’s reasoning allows RFRA standing in some circumstances where a
corporation is not closely held, although those circumstances are likely to be
extremely rare, if not nonexistent in practice. But that shows precisely that the
Court has not ignored separate corporate personality, as the first type of complaint
asserts. Where the second sort of complaint goes wrong is that it does not have a
good theory for why a broader conception of RFRA standing is objectionable. The
underlying emotion seems to be that corporations are dodgy, profit-obsessed
forces, which should not be allowed to be free of valid legal restrictions. 164 But
that objection, in turn, ignores the whole progressive corporate law project of
creating a legal and practical space for socially responsible corporations. Many
corporations are indeed profit-obsessed organizations that trample on other values,
but many are not, and nothing in the law requires that they be that way. The
majority decision in Hobby Lobby recognizes this, and liberals should celebrate
that.
A response to this claim that the majority opinion embodies a liberal
vision of the corporation is: Progressive corporate law is about doing more than
the law requires, whereas Hobby Lobby is about opting out of legal
requirements.165 But both progressive corporate law and the Hobby Lobby opinion
agree in seeing corporations as ways for like-minded persons to come together to
pursue shared goals to advance a shared vision of the common good in ways that
go beyond simply complying with the law. The key issue that the RFRA context
brings to the forefront is that different groups and corporations may have different
conceptions of the common good and how to pursue it—indeed, in a diverse
society, that happens all of the time. What, then, should we do when a corporation
pursuing a religiously grounded view of the good runs into conflict with a legal
rule? Can we make room for both the group’s vision and achieving the purposes of
the law? That brings us to the operation of RFRA once one has determined that a
particular organization’s objection to following a law is indeed grounded in the
exercise of religion—the subject to which we now turn.

V. SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN
The Court’s holding on corporate standing has received the most
attention, and for good reason, as that holding applies to a multitude of federal
statutes. However, the opinion does not end with the discussion of corporate
standing (nor does its criticism). Once the Court holds that the corporate plaintiffs
may invoke the protection of RFRA, it must then go on to apply the statute. That
happens in two steps. First, the Court must decide whether or not the complainedof ACA mandate imposes a substantial burden on the plaintiffs’ exercise of
religion. If it determines the answer is yes, as the majority does in Hobby Lobby, it
must then ask whether this application of the ACA can be justified under the strict
163.
See, e.g., Greenfield, supra note 7. This line of argument begins with Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Although the
Court attempts to cabin its language to closely held corporations, its logic extends to
corporations of any size, public or private.”).
164.
Id.
165.
Pollman, supra note 54, at 21 (responding to this Article).
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scrutiny standard, i.e., as the least restrictive means for achieving a compelling
governmental interest.
Both of these steps have produced widespread scorn and fear from liberal
commentators. In some cases that reaction stems from ignorance about what the
Court actually said and did, but certainly not always. Indeed, Justice Ginsburg’s
dissent nicely illustrates the strength of the reaction. The opening of that dissent
deserves extended quotation:
In a decision of startling breadth, the Court holds that commercial
enterprises, including corporations, along with partnerships and sole
proprietorships, can opt out of any law (saving only tax laws) they
judge incompatible with their sincerely held religious beliefs.
Compelling governmental interests in uniform compliance with the
law, and disadvantages that religion-based opt-outs impose on
others, hold no sway, the Court decides, at least where there is a
“less restrictive alternative.” And such an alternative, the Court
suggests, there always will be whenever, in lieu of tolling an
enterprise claiming a religion-based exemption, the government,
i.e., the general public, can pick up the tab.
. . . In the Court’s view, RFRA demands accommodation of forprofit corporation’s religious beliefs no matter the impact that
accommodation may have on third parties who do not share the
corporation owners’ religious faith—in these cases, thousands of
women employed by Hobby Lobby and Conestoga or dependents of
persons those corporations employ. Persuaded that Congress
enacted RFRA to serve a far less radical purpose, and mindful of the
havoc the Court’s judgment can introduce, I dissent.166

There is no “respectfully” in that “I dissent.” It is strong stuff, and it is far
from just the holding on corporate standing that Justice Ginsburg finds so
disturbing.
In much of the reaction to Hobby Lobby, it seems easy to detect some
resistance to RFRA itself, with a desire to limit the reach of that statute. Why
might one find such resistance, given the strong support of liberals at RFRA’s
origin, and given RFRA’s roots in earlier Supreme Court opinions endorsed by
many of the most liberal justices in the history of the Court? 167
One concern may be the great potential breadth of RFRA. It applies to all
statutes, even though they say nothing about religion, and have no purpose of
burdening religion.168 The federal government has a huge number of statutes, and
there are a huge variety of competing religious groups in the United States.169 If
“significant burden” is interpreted expansively, then it could easily happen that
even the most well intentioned of statutes significantly burden some persons’

166.
Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
167.
Supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text.
168.
Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2761.
169.
See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888
(1990); Laycock, supra note 24, at 842.
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religious beliefs under some circumstances. 170 Moreover, if the strict scrutiny
language is interpreted as being strict in theory, but fatal in fact, that will lead to a
large number of accommodations. Insofar as liberals are more generally positive
than conservatives about the large number of restrictions on private behavior
contained in our modern administrative state, they might be more attuned to a
threat to the wide web of federal statutes and regulations.
However, this critique of the RFRA principle was well understood before
the passage of RFRA—it forms the core of Justice Scalia’s decision in Smith.171
And yet, that critique obviously did not stop liberal dissents in that case or liberal
support of RFRA.172 In what follows, I will give due regard for this concern about
an overly aggressive use of RFRA, but I do not think it adequately explains the
highly polarized reaction to Hobby Lobby. I am afraid that another part of the
reaction is that liberals today see RFRA primarily as an assertion of power by
conservative Christians against laws that reflect liberal victories in the ongoing
culture wars.173 The ACA is one such victory and much comment on Hobby Lobby
has focused on speculation about the implications for protections against
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, another major battle site in the
culture wars.174 Why the change from when RFRA passed in 1993? The answer
may be that the perceived beneficiaries of the RFRA principle have shifted. In the
old Free Exercise cases, the plaintiffs were religious groups that were generally on
the fringes of society—Amish, Seventh Day Adventists, and persons engaged in
traditional Native American rituals. Liberals were more inclined to sympathize
with such relative social outcasts. In Hobby Lobby, the ACA provision was
objectionable to a wider array of more mainstream religious organizations, which
is also true for the much discussed possible application of RFRA to anti-gay
discrimination laws.175 Conservatives on the Court, most prominently Justice
Scalia himself, have hence switched from Justice Scalia’s position in Smith to
strong support of RFRA, while liberals have made the opposite switch.
If this is a part of the explanation for the reaction to Hobby Lobby, it is a
shame. It represents a repudiation of some of the core values of the liberal
tradition.176 Many who would call themselves liberals seem to have forgotten that
the word is derived from “liberty,” and support for liberty includes support for
religious liberty.177 The United States is a large and diverse country, with many
religious groups holding deeply opposed core beliefs. Whenever a law forces
believers of some religion to violate strongly held beliefs in order to comply with
that law, we have made it harder for such diversity to thrive.178 That is a loss to
those who value being part of a diverse society—which should be understood as a
core commitment of liberalism.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Lupu, supra note 27, at 180.
See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text.
Laycock, supra note 24, at 870.
Id. at 848–51.
Id.
NUSSBAUM, supra note 14, at 125.
Id.
Laycock, supra note 24, at 841–42.
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Of course, sometimes there is no way to avoid a conflict between genuine
beliefs and the imperatives driving a law. But some laws may reflect the views of a
majority that at the time of enactment had the power to pass the law, and which
majority did little to consider the effect on those who did not share some core
beliefs.179 Even for laws that do not reflect such a one-sided imposition of
contested beliefs, the laws may be applied in a variety of circumstances that were
not anticipated, and may cause distress to some religious believers in ways that the
drafters would have wanted to avoid had they anticipated it.180
For these reasons, it makes sense to ask whether a law causes some
people to act against religious beliefs that are important to them, and when the
answer is yes, to ask further whether there is some accommodation that can
eliminate or reduce the conflict while still achieving the legitimate goals of the
law. That is what RFRA does. There are dangers if one applies this principle too
vigorously, but also a loss if we do not apply it vigorously enough. So, let us
examine how the Court applies RFRA in Hobby Lobby, and see if it strikes a
proper balance. The remainder of this section considers the substantial burden
inquiry, and the following section considers the strict scrutiny inquiry. To
anticipate my conclusions, I think the Court reaches the right results in both
inquiries, with generally good arguments. In both sections, I see some potential
concerns for future cases, and I suggest modifications that may strike a better
balance.
How should a court determine whether a law substantially burdens a
person’s religious beliefs? I find this to be the hardest part of Hobby Lobby to get a
handle on, and I have swung back and forth on how best to think about it. It
provides somewhat chilly comfort to realize that the substantial burden prong
seems to have been problematic for both courts and scholars for decades. 181 The
majority opinion in Hobby Lobby takes a subjective approach to this question,
while the dissent takes an objective approach. Each approach has complementary
strengths and weaknesses.
The substantial burden puzzle in Hobby Lobby comes from the oddly
indirect nature of the burden. The corporations are not being forced to buy
contraceptives for themselves,182 nor are they supplying contraceptives directly to
their employees. They are paying insurers to provide payment for medical services
and items. If an employee asks for contraception and her doctor chooses to write a
prescription, the insurer will then pay for them. The employer is pretty far
removed from the decision to use the contraceptives. Even if the employer objects
to their use because it believes them to be an abortifacient, does this indirect tie to
the objectionable actions mean there is no substantial burden on the employer?
On this issue, persons and religions may differ both as to the morality of
the contraceptives and also as to the hard moral question of how much moral
179.
Id.
180.
Laycock & Thomas, supra note 26, at 217.
181.
W. Cole Durham, State RFRAs and the Scope of Free Exercise Protection,
32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 665, 689–711 (1999); Laycock & Thomas, supra note 26, at 228–30;
Lund, supra note 45, at 488.
182.
Corporations are certainly not persons for that purpose.
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agency one must have in a particular action in order to be complicit in that action.
Imagine persons belonging to three religions. According to religion A, there is
nothing wrong with the contraceptives. According to religion B, the contraceptives
are wrong, but not drastically so, and it has a fairly relaxed understanding of causal
complicity, so the employer’s role in this situation is a minor transgression.
According to religion C, the contraceptives are profoundly evil, and it has a strict
understanding of causal complicity, so the employer’s role would be seen as
deeply wrong, in ways that strike at core beliefs. How should we analyze the
burden in these three cases?
Using the subjective approach of the Hobby Lobby majority, there is no
burden for believers of religion A, because there is no violation of religious belief
at all. However, believers of religions B and C are treated the same. The Court
simply asks whether the employer’s proscribed actions violate sincerely held
beliefs, as they do for both religions. It does not ask about how strongly held those
beliefs are.183 The only question it asks about degree of burden concerns the legal
penalty involved for violating the law. Here, the fines imposed are quite
substantial—and of course, the fines are the same for B and C.
Why treat the two cases as the same? The Court does not want to be
drawn into debates as to the reasonableness of competing moral views. The
question of complicity is a hard moral question, 184 and the Court does not want to
say that some religions have a better answer than others 185 (as we shall see, the
dissent’s approach does that). The core purpose of RFRA is to respect the variety
of religious beliefs; were the Court to start treating the beliefs of one religion as
less substantial than the beliefs of another, it would be acting at odds with that
purpose.186
But this approach has a weakness. It forces the Court to take any assertion
of a burden as substantial, as long as that assertion is sincere. If a plaintiff says the
burden is substantial, and does not seem to be lying, that ends the inquiry on this
question. But that seems problematic, for at least two reasons. First, it extends
significantly the number of circumstances in which courts may find substantial
burdens, thus increasing the tension between RFRA and legitimate and important
statutory goals.187 And second, cases like believers in religion B above seem pretty
peripheral to the concerns that motivate RFRA. RFRA is meant to ease the burden
where believers are forced to go against important beliefs if they are to obey a
statute. It is aimed at reducing moral dilemmas, not inconveniences. 188 The

183.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775–79 (2014).
184.
The law struggles with the question of complicity in many areas. An example
is the standard to impose for when aiding a crime becomes criminal or tortious. See Eugene
Volokh, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act and Complicity in Sin, WASH. POST (June
30, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/30/thereligious-freedom-restoration-act-and-complicity-in-sin/.
185.
Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2778.
186.
Durham, supra note 181, at 708; Laycock, supra note 24, at 874–75.
187.
See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text.
188.
This objection suggests that courts consider how central the religious belief
at issue in a case is to the belief system of the party claiming RFRA protection. Such a
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potential for abuse is even worse if courts are reluctant to examine the sincerity of
RFRA plaintiffs.
To avoid these problems, the dissent takes an objective approach. It
asserts that the link between the religious beliefs and the ACA requirement is “too
attenuated to rank as substantial.”189 It treats this question of attenuated or not too
attenuated as an objective matter of law. But of course drawing the line involves
making moral and philosophical distinctions, and different religions will differ as
to how they draw the line. In drawing the line where it does, the dissent is taking
sides on a deep religious debate, and telling those who disagree with its
conclusions that their deeply held feelings of moral violation at being forced to
behave in a way they find reprehensible simply do not count. That goes against the
spirit of RFRA190—not surprisingly, since Justice Ginsburg seems none too moved
by that spirit.
This is a hard problem, and no approach is free from serious objection.
Forced to choose, I would take the majority’s subjective approach over the
dissent’s objective approach. At least the former takes seriously the internal
perspective of the religious plaintiffs, which is critical to the purpose of RFRA.191
However, if I redesigned the statute, I would implement what one might call an
inter-subjective approach. This approach would not only look at sincerity, but also
ask how important a particular belief is within the relevant belief system. 192 Note,
the court must work within the religious belief system of the plaintiff, taking the
system’s beliefs and internal logic as given, and then try to determine how much
weight a person acting within that system would assign to violating the belief in
question. This takes the internal perspective of religions seriously, while limiting
somewhat the application of RFRA and avoiding its use in situations where
plaintiffs experience mere inconvenience rather than a serious moral dilemma. I
think that such an approach has some support in the pre-Smith Free Exercise case
law. Most notable is Yoder, in which the Court went into much detail as to how
much harm to the Amish religion a requirement to attend school until age sixteen
might cause.193
However, the Supreme Court was probably not free to adopt this
approach in Hobby Lobby. The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act of 2000 added language that specifies that the exercise of religion covers “any
exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of
religious belief.”194 That seems to rule out my preferred inter-subjective approach,
which looks to the centrality of a particular belief within the broader system. I

centrality approach has been considered and rejected for good reasons related to the
discussion here.
189.
Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
190.
See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
191.
See supra note 174 and accompanying test.
192.
A number of circuit courts followed a similar approach in early RFRA cases.
See Durham, supra note 181, at 704–08.
193.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 210–13 (1972).
194.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2000).

2015]

HOBBY LOBBY

815

think this statutory language is unwise, but the Court must work within it. 195
Forced to choose, it is probably right to choose the subjective approach. However,
in the future the Court may want to look more closely at the sincerity of asserted
religious beliefs, especially where a business will benefit financially from avoiding
application of a law, raising concern that its real motivation is financial. In Hobby
Lobby, that does not seem to be a concern, because insurance coverage should be
no cheaper if the contraceptive coverage is dropped. This would also seem to
alleviate any Establishment Clause concern in the case—religious corporations
like Hobby Lobby are not gaining any competitive or financial advantage. 196

VI. LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS
Having decided that the corporate plaintiffs had standing to sue under
RFRA and that the ACA contraceptive mandate imposed a substantial burden on
their exercise of religion, the Court had to face a final question. That question was
whether the government could justify the mandate as the least restrictive means to
achieve a compelling governmental interest. 197 The proper way of applying this
strict scrutiny standard has been a point of contention since the passage of
RFRA,198 and the way in which the Court applied it in Hobby Lobby has been a
source of anxiety for those who are suspicious of an aggressive use of the
statute.199
The strict scrutiny language of RFRA was taken from the pre-Smith case
law.200 In general, the strict scrutiny standard is quite hard to meet. Once a statute
is subjected to the standard, it is unlikely to pass the scrutiny. However, in the Free
Exercise context, the Court wobbled somewhat over time. In some cases, it applied
strict scrutiny in the usual rigorous way, but in other cases, it engaged in a much
less rigorous balancing in which the government was able to justify statutes
without too much trouble.201
The rigor of strict scrutiny is the key reason why the Court decided to
stop applying that standard in Smith, the case that RFRA (partially) overturned.
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Smith noted that applying the substantial burden test to
all facially-neutral standards would lead to applying strict scrutiny on many
occasions, and if the strict scrutiny standard were honestly applied, it would lead to

195.
For a strong argument against considering the centrality of beliefs, see
Durham, supra note 180, at 708–09.
196.
Religious belief must be the dominant or principal motivation for action in
order for a burden to be substantial. See Douglas Laycock, RFRA, Congress, and the
Ratchet, 56 MONT. L. REV. 145, 151 (1995). In the commercial setting, this requirement is
useful to weed out situations where businesses may be seeking an accommodation to gain a
financial advantage over rivals.
197.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (1993).
198.
Durham, supra note 181, at 713–21.
199.
See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 5; Ford, supra note 5.
200.
See supra notes 28–41 and accompanying text.
201.
See James E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An
Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1412 (1992); Laycock & Thomas, supra
note 26, at 222; Lupu, supra note 27, at 182–85; Volokh, supra note 29, at 1494–98.
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requiring religious accommodations on most of those occasions. 202 This critique
has some merit, but imposing only rational basis scrutiny instead leads to weak
protection of religious liberty, as Justice O’Connor in her concurrence203 and
Justice Blackmun in his dissent204 point out.
Given the validity of both perspectives, it is perhaps unfortunate (and a
bit puzzling) that the Court did not find a rather obvious compromise. If strict
scrutiny was too strong and rational basis was too weak, why not use the
intermediate scrutiny standard?205 Under that standard, a law is justified if the
means chosen are substantially related to furthering an important government
interest.206 The whole point of this standard is to allow courts to balance competing
concerns in circumstances where both sides are likely to have interests that the
Court finds sympathetic, as is generally the case in Free Exercise claims. The
failure to adopt the intermediate scrutiny standard is particularly puzzling given
that a close analogy was easily available. In so-called time, place, and manner
cases under the Free Speech clause, the Court applies intermediate scrutiny. 207
These are cases where a law does not directly regulate speech, but where its
application in the circumstances at hand restricts speech. This is directly analogous
to the Smith and RFRA circumstances, where a law that does not regulate religion
directly operates to burden religious exercise in the circumstances at hand. Much
subsequent complication could have been avoided had the Court adopted this
middle ground. Using intermediate scrutiny to engage in the hard case-by-case
balancing required to properly adjudicate in this area would be more intellectually
honest than applying a weakened form of strict scrutiny. An intermediate scrutiny
analysis would also avoid the problem of courts slipping into applying a strict
standard, which creates practical and political difficulties, but which is suggested
by the statutory language.
For whatever reason, the Smith Court did not adopt intermediate scrutiny,
and when Congress decided to overturn Smith, it simply adopted the strict scrutiny
standard from the pre-Smith cases. Given the politics that now surround RFRA,
this language seems likely to remain in place for the foreseeable future.
Presumably Democrats would be happy to replace the strict scrutiny language with
an intermediate scrutiny standard. However, Republicans would not agree, and so
RFRA will not be amended as long as Republicans retain enough power within the
House, the Senate, or the Presidency.
And so, much depends upon how courts apply the strict scrutiny standard.
Has the Court in Hobby Lobby really applied strict scrutiny in an aggressive and

202.
Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886–89
(1990).
203.
Id. at 891 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
204.
Id. at 908–09 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
205.
Others have suggested this. See Rodney A. Smolla, The Free Exercise of
Religion After the Fall: The Case for Intermediate Scrutiny, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 925
(1998). Eugene Volokh has a somewhat similar proposal calling for a common law
approach to judicial scrutiny in Free Exercise cases. See Volokh, supra note 29, at 1502–05.
206.
See Smolla, supra note 205, at 940–41.
207.
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
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reckless way, as some fear?208 I think not, although it is not completely free of
doubt. The majority opinion assumes guaranteeing all women access to
contraceptives is a compelling interest. Before doing so, it notes in passing that the
existence of a number of exemptions calls into question how compelling that
interest really is.209 That point on exemptions was the source of much argument in
the briefs for the case,210 and there is some logic to the concern—if the government
is willing to grant a large number of exemptions to a requirement, how compelling
does it really find the interest underlying that requirement? 211 The Ginsburg dissent
attacks this argument concerning exemptions, noting that such exemptions are a
common way to account for various competing interests.212 Both sides have a point
here—one should not automatically infer from the existence of exemptions that the
interest underlying a statute is not compelling, and yet at some point a proliferation
of exemptions may help show that the government does not really see the asserted
interest as all that compelling. At any rate, Justice Alito’s opinion does not pursue
the exemption argument, because it assumes the asserted interest is compelling.213
That leads to the question of whether the contraceptive mandate is the
least restrictive means to achieve the compelling interest of guaranteeing women
access to contraceptives. The Court considers two alternative means that might
achieve that goal while restricting religious liberty less. The first of these is to have
the government itself pay to provide the contraceptives at issue where employers
object on religious grounds.214 Justice Alito appears quite taken with this
alternative. Alas, it potentially opens up a can of worms: How much cost might the
government be forced to bear in order to avoid imposing a burden on the religious
exercise of some? Justice Alito argues that the answer is not zero cost, 215 and yet
admits that cost may be a legitimate consideration, 216 and Justice Ginsburg rightly
points out that the question of how much cost is too much has no clear dividing
line.217 Moreover, how well can courts evaluate likely costs in determining
whether RFRA may require government to pay? There is also an Establishment
Clause concern lurking: If the government were required to pay a substantial

208.
See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 5; Ford, supra note 5.
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57, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (No. 13-354), 2014 WL 173486, at *51–57;
Brief for the Respondents at 49–55, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (No. 13356), 2014 WL 546900, at *49–55; Brief for Respondents at 50–54, Hobby Lobby Stores,
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the U.S. Code, 56 MONT. L. REV. 249, 254 (1995); Laycock, supra note 24, at 873.
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amount to support the employees of religious employers, would that give such
employers a financial advantage over competitors who did not receive such a
governmental subsidy? In that case, wouldn’t the employers with a specific
religious belief be benefiting at the expense of others? 218
Perhaps because of these problems, Justice Alito does not rely on the
government pays alternative219—although he may give more credence to that
alternative than he should. Rather, the majority opinion ultimately relies upon a
better alternative accommodation. Encouragingly, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence
seems to put almost all of its weight upon this alternative, rather than on the option
of having the government pay. 220
That alternative accommodation is one that HHS had already devised for
more clearly religious employers. If an organization that HHS has designated as
eligible for this arrangement certifies that it objects to providing coverage for some
contraceptives, then the organization’s insurers must exclude coverage from that
employer’s health plan and instead itself provide separate payments for the
excluded contraceptives.221 Apparently insurers are willing to go along with this
because the expected savings in reduced services for pregnant women balances the
cost of the contraceptives.
That fact is important because it means this particular accommodation has
extremely limited scope. If one imagines, for instance, a corporation run by
Christian scientists that objects to coverage for a broad range of medical
procedures that violate their beliefs, even though they are willing to cover a limited
range of medical procedures, insurers would certainly not be willing or able to pay
for such a wide range of procedures on their own, without someone paying the
related premiums.
But as for the contraceptive accommodation, were the government to
simply extend this already existing accommodation to the broader range of
protected organizations recognized as due RFRA protection under the first part of
the opinion, then everyone wins.222 The employers have at least less of a burden on
their religious liberty, insurers apparently break even, and the employees will still
get coverage of all contraceptives specified by HHS regulation at no additional
cost.
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence puts great stress on how well this
accommodation balances all competing interests, on how narrow it is, and on how
much tougher the questions become where insurers are not willing to step into the
gap.223 In both tone and substance, this concurrence creates much less of a sense of
218.
The RFRA principle has long been noted to be in tension with the
Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indep. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S.
707, 724–26 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
219.
Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2781–82.
220.
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221.
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222.
Douglas Laycock, The Law Worked the Way It Should, N.Y. TIMES (July 1,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/06/30/congress-religion-and-thesupreme-courts-hobby-lobby-decision/the-religious-freedom-act-worked-the-way-it-should.
223.
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aggressively imposing the strict scrutiny language of RFRA. Rather, it engages in
a nuanced and context-specific balancing act. The result of that balancing is highly
persuasive, given the unique circumstances surrounding the accommodation that
had already been created for other organizations. 224 To anyone who finds the
principle underlying RFRA at all compelling, the balance here should be quite
persuasive. The extreme reaction against the opinion seems either a
misunderstanding of the opinion, a mistrustful fear of what is to follow, or a sign
that many on the political left nowadays do not find the principle underlying
RFRA at all compelling.
There is, however, one complication in the Court’s use of this existing
accommodation to argue that the imposition on religious corporations is not
justified. That complication: the possibility that in the future the Court may hold
that this accommodation itself violates RFRA. If it does so, it may have pulled off
a nasty bait and switch. And there is some possibility that the Court will do so.
Organizations subject to the special accommodation have sued claiming that it too
violates RFRA.225 The majority opinion notes this, and refuses to commit as to
how it might decide those cases.226 Several days after delivering the Hobby Lobby
case, the Court granted a preliminary injunction in one of the cases involving this
accommodation.227 In doing so the Court at least acknowledged that the plaintiffs
had an argument of some strength, although it does not give any of its own
analysis of the merits.228
How should we understand this injunction in the Wheaton College case?
Is the Court about to pull a bait and switch, using the availability of this limited
accommodation to strike down the contraceptive mandate in Hobby Lobby but then
striking down the accommodation in turn, leaving no good way to advance the
compelling interest at stake in the mandate? It is possible, and if so, that would
undermine much of the merit of the decision in Hobby Lobby. However, I do not
expect such a sad outcome. Wheaton College is a preliminary injunction—one
possibility is that the Court is just trying to maintain the status quo, but will
ultimately side with the government. The apparent presence of Justice Breyer in
the Wheaton College majority suggests that—it would seem very unlikely that
Justice Breyer plans to side with the plaintiff in Wheaton College after joining the
dissent in Hobby Lobby.
If the Court does ultimately decide for the plaintiffs on the merits in
Wheaton College, much will depend upon what it points to as a less restrictive
alternative. One possibility is that the plaintiff’s victory will be Pyrrhic. Some
language in the short order in Wheaton College suggests that the Court may decide
that the precise procedure devised by HHS to accommodate religious employers
imposes an unnecessary burden, but that a small tweak in the procedure would
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make it acceptable.229 That result would be fine as well, even if it does slice the
bologna a bit thin. If instead the Court points to a more problematic alternative,
such as the government paying for contraceptive coverage, 230 the result would be
more disturbing, and more indicative of an aggressive use of the strict scrutiny
language in RFRA in a way that does little to acknowledge the important goals of
statutes subject to a RFRA claim. I can certainly see some of the justices in the
Hobby Lobby majority going that route, but given his concurrence, it is hard to see
Justice Kennedy doing so.
Thus, there are some elements in Justice Alito’s least restrictive means
analysis that could point to unwelcome developments down the line. However,
other elements of that analysis are quite strong, especially when viewed through
the lens of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.231 The result in the case itself is fully
justified. Those who are objecting so vigorously need to explain why we should
not be making this low-cost, win-win accommodation available. Yes, the ACA is
an important statute—it promotes many important goals, and represents probably
the most important liberal achievement within the federal government since the
presidency of Lyndon Johnson. The contraception mandate in particular advances
goals that most liberals do and should affirm as compelling. But, all that should not
stop us from understanding that some persons do deeply object to that mandate,
and where they act as employers they do honestly believe that providing insurance
on such terms is profoundly at odds with their personal religious commitments. If
we can readily respond to those objections so that female employees will still get
the mandated coverage at no extra cost, why on earth not do so? Doesn’t the
opposition to this accommodation show a complete lack of any empathy with the
religious beliefs and strivings of those like the plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby? And is
that lack of empathy at all consistent with the traditional liberal commitment to a
diverse society and religious liberty?

CONCLUSION
In case you hadn’t noticed, those last few questions are rhetorical. I find
the emotional reaction against the Hobby Lobby case dispiriting. It shows no
empathy for persons with differing worldviews, mostly ignores the detailed facts
and reasoning in the case, and shows a desire to crush all opposition,232 even where
a highly limited and reasonable accommodation that should hurt no one is
available. In part this flows from suspicion about what is to follow. That suspicion
is not groundless—we have seen various points where Justice Alito’s opinion
could be taken in disturbing directions, particularly in a potential willingness to
229.
Wheaton, 134 S. Ct. at 2807 (“[T]he applicant has already notified the
Government—without using EBSA Form 700—that it meets the requirements for
exemption from the contraceptive coverage requirement on religious grounds. Nothing in
this order precludes the Government from relying on this notice, to the extent it considers it
necessary, to facilitate the provision of full contraceptive coverage under the Act.”).
230.
See supra notes 214–20 and accompanying text.
231.
And recall, Justice Kennedy did join Justice Alito’s opinion, so that opinion
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232.
Laycock, supra note 24, at 879 (noting, correctly, that the desire of each side
for a “total win” has made RFRA into a nasty battleground).
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take all professions of being burdened as automatically self-authenticating,233 his
toying with the government-pays option as a less restrictive alternative, 234 and the
possibility that he and his colleagues may pull a bait and switch by invalidating the
compromise accommodation used to show that something better could be done for
the plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby.235 I too have some worries about where many
members of the majority of the opinion will side on these matters in the future,
although Justice Kennedy’s concurrence makes me fairly optimistic that for now a
majority of the Court will not move in that direction. Liberal suspicion also reflects
the highly polarized politics surrounding the Court, and indeed the United States in
general.
But the strength of the anti-Hobby Lobby outrage seems to go well
beyond these somewhat reasonable sources of concern to an underlying suspicion
of RFRA itself. I suggest above my take on why the politics on RFRA have shifted
from strong initial support to current opposition. 236 Originally, RFRA and the old
Free Exercise Clause case law it resurrected were seen as supporting
nonmainstream religious minorities, and such support fit well with liberal support
for diversity and the disempowered. Now, RFRA seems to have become a tool for
more mainstream conservative religious groups who are fighting rearguard actions
in the culture wars after losses in the legislature. 237 As the victors in the legislature,
many liberals are unwilling to give aid to their enemies, especially because those
enemies are still politically powerful and trying to limit the liberties of others, such
as pregnant women and gay people.238 Not only does this reflect poorly on the
depth of their commitment to core values of liberty, it is probably politically
unwise as well. In the current climate, a robust use of RFRA can help turn down
the intensity of the culture wars. If religious conservatives feel they have some
protection against statutes that may force them to act against deeply held beliefs,
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they have less incentive to follow a scorched earth legislative and political
strategy.239
The other main source of the outrage pertaining to the Hobby Lobby
decision stems from its corporate standing holding. There is some legitimate cause
for misgiving there as well. The majority opinion is rather hazy on the details of
corporate law and structure, and some language puts too much emphasis on the
views of individual shareholders rather than on the statements and actions of the
corporation itself.240 There is room for corporate law scholars of all stripes to argue
over what exactly the opinion says and how it may be applied in future situations.
But the core of popular reaction against this part of the decision seems to be
populist distrust of corporations and ridicule over the idea of corporations as
persons. That reaction is rooted in some highly genuine concerns about the role of
corporations in modern society and politics;241 still, those concerns are completely
misplaced in this instance. The liberal and progressive agenda within corporate law
is to create as much legal, practical, and ideological space as possible for
corporations that pursue a variety of social values while still looking to make some
money. Justice Alito’s opinion fits readily within that agenda.
Thus, Justice Alito’s majority opinion rests on two core principles: (1) a
broad understanding of the potential social purposes of corporations; and (2) a
commitment to reducing the burden on diverse religious groups within society.
How sad it is to see so many liberals condemning a decision based on values they
have traditionally held dear.
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